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## The 1994 Hungarian Election in Historical Perspective

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### Introduction

In the spring of 1994 Hungarian voters, following their counterparts in Poland and Lithuania, returned the former communists to power. The victory of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was indeed impressive. More than tripling its 1990 result, MSZP captured an absolute majority of seats in parliament. For the first time in history, Hungarians had freely voted a leftist party into power. The parties of the right, victors in the first post-communist election, suffered a crushing defeat, their support falling to an all-time low. Yet, contrary to MSZP's parliamentary landslide (and popular perception), this "left turn" did *not* represent a historic breakthrough in leftist support within society: the percentage of the popular vote received by MSZP in 1994 (33 per cent) was not significantly different from the support given to the Social Democratic Party and the Hungarian Communist Party together in each of the two elections prior to the advent of state-socialism in the late 1940s. Ironically, as we will see, it is the 1990 outcome, touted by Szelényi and Szelényi (1991: 123) as reflecting the strong Hungarian "taste for Christian-nationalist political rule," that turns out to be the historical anomaly.

This contribution explores trends in Hungarian voting behavior between 1945 and 1994 through analysis of settlement level electoral results from the 1945, 1947, 1990, and 1994 national parliamentary elections.<sup>1</sup> The database contains outcomes on approximately 3,000 communities. My intentions in this essay are relatively modest: to describe patterns of electoral continuity and discontinuity between 1945 and 1994. Ultimately, of course, I seek to explain these patterns as well. I would like to know, for example, whether stable loyalties arise from

<sup>1</sup> The 1994 data used here, as well as selected data from the 1990 census, has been keyed in by the author. The data for 1990 were made available by the Alliance of Free Democrats. I am grateful to the Institute for Political History, and in particular to László Hubay, for generously offering the 1945 and 1947 data while they are still in preparation for publication. While I have made every attempt to ensure the accuracy of these data, no guarantee can be given. I also thank Suzanne Berger, Zsolt Enyedi, Abby Innes, and especially Gábor Tóka for their comments on earlier drafts. László Pálházy and István Szakadát provided much appreciated help in constructing the list of villages used in the analysis.

embedded social divisions rather than partisan attachments. But I cannot do this until the patterns of congruence themselves are recognized. Throughout the text political or electoral "preference," "loyalty," and "attachment" are used interchangeably to mean voting preference unless otherwise noted.

After 40 years of dictatorship and wrenching social change the pre-communist past may seem a distant memory, of little relevance for understanding contemporary electoral behavior. Most Hungarians were born after the advent of state-socialism, and seem more preoccupied with day-to-day existence than with party politics. However, there are a number of reasons comparing pre- and post-communist electoral behavior is worthwhile. First, it can illuminate the ways in which state-socialism succeeded or failed in recasting Hungarian political preferences. Where has the right maintained its strength? In what areas did leftist loyalties emerge where none had existed before? How did the liberals fashion their support out of fragments of the old leftist and Christian-national constituencies? Second, to the extent that there are electoral continuities between the two periods it will provide evidence that voting preferences are less fluid than is often assumed. Continuities suggest that even in 1990 there were limits on the ability of parties to remake the electorate as they saw fit, since parties had to operate within the constraints defined by the already existing political preferences in a given area. Finally, a comparison of pre- and post-communist electoral results symbolically reinserts the state-socialist period into the history of Hungarian political behavior. The continuities and discontinuities that are uncovered provide a trace of the way state-socialism was experienced in a given settlement or county, revealing local resistances and vulnerabilities.

Merging the 1945 through 1994 electoral data required making certain changes in these databases. Some settlements that existed in 1945 had disappeared by 1990; some contemporary settlements did not exist in 1945. For some settlements the data are missing. The database used here consists only of settlements that had a continuous existence throughout the period under study. As a consequence the overall vote totals in the database differ somewhat from officially published figures. These minor deviations, amounting to less than 1 per cent, are of no consequence for the arguments presented here. The differences between the official regional list results and the results obtained from the database are presented in Table I of the Annex. Parties and their abbreviations are given in List I of the Annex.

### **Electoral Trends, 1990-1994**

In Hungary as elsewhere in much of Central and Eastern Europe the ruling Communist Party was swept from power in the first post-communist election in 1990. The new center-right coalition government consisted of three parties: the national-populist Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF); the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), a revived pre-communist agrarian party with roots in the inter-war period; and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), the self-styled successor to the Democratic People's Party of the 1940s. Two liberal parties were in parliamentary opposition: the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), founded by anti-communist dissident intellectuals; and the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), established by young intellectuals who made a generational appeal. Rounding out the opposition was the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the reformist successor to the former ruling Communist Party, named Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP).

Enormous disappointment, bitterness, anger, and resentment arose between 1990 and 1994 in the course of Hungary's transition to liberal capitalism. However, despite vicious infighting within and between parties, the creation of new parliamentary parties, enormous swings in partisan preferences, and fears of a resurgence of extremism on both the left and the right, party support remained stable. Only MSZP and MDF experienced drastic changes in their levels of electoral support in 1994 relative to 1990. MSZP tripled its result; MDF support dropped by a half. The losses and gains of the other parties were comparatively small. After the 1994 election a new social-liberal ruling coalition was formed between MSZP and SZDSZ.

The purpose of this section is to summarize continuities and discontinuities in electoral behavior since 1990. Congruence in vote between 1990 and 1994 will be measured through the use of bivariate regression analysis. I regress the fraction of the regional list vote obtained in 1994 on the fraction of the regional list vote obtained in 1990. According to the logic presented in Carey and Shugart (1995), closed list results are less apt to reflect personal reputations than candidate voting in single-member constituencies. Thus, regional list results are used here, because my purpose is to measure underlying support for parties independent of the popularity of particular candidates. There are two main quantities of interest associated with this model: the slope and  $R^2$ . The slope coefficient estimates an average congruence between votes. It measures how much more of the 1994 vote a party would get on average for a percentage point increase in the 1990 vote. The revised  $R^2$ , or aggregate congruence, measures the degree to which parties actually reproduced across settlements the average congruence estimated by the slope. In other words, it indicates how much the

estimated average electoral congruence reflects processes going on at the settlement level rather than just the serendipitous average of widely different levels of congruence in different communities.

The reason linear regression is used here is that perfect congruence would be a linear relationship between the two votes, where the constant is zero and both the average and aggregate congruence equal one. In this case, a party exactly reproduces its outcome in every settlement. The regression result can be interpreted as a gauge of how far reality departs from such an idealized model of continuity.<sup>2</sup>

An advantage of this method is that it is based on electoral results rather than estimates of party preference based on survey research. Whether or not one agrees with Gelman and King (1993) that electoral results represent "enlightened preferences," assuming the absence of electoral fraud they are subject to less uncertainty than whatever preferences are being tapped in survey research. We know, for example, that survey estimates of Hungarian voter loyalty and mobility suffer from recall bias and sampling variation. Consider two sets of estimates, provided by Fábián and Tóth (1996) and by Evans and Whitefield (1995), shown in Table 1.

The numbers in this table represent the percentage of a party's 1990 voting base estimated to have voted for the same party in 1994. Except for MSZP and SZDSZ the differences between the estimates are far from trivial. Even the rank orderings predicted by the two methods differ. For details on the methodologies underlying these estimates, the reader is referred to the original articles. The Hungarian Panel Study data used by Fábián and Tóth (hereafter the Panel Study) is probably more trustworthy given its larger sample. Nonetheless, the differences in estimated loyalties are sobering.

2 Given my use of aggregate electoral data ecological regression techniques would appear superior to simple linear regression. There are two reasons I have not used ecological regression. First, an ecological analysis of voter transitions between 1990 and 1994 involved computing the transition probabilities in a 6x6 table (there having been six parties entering parliament in both 1990 and 1994). During the initial stages of analysis (in 1996), I did in fact attempt a number of ecological regressions, but could not produce results that made logical sense. The method offered in King (1997), designed to solve many such computational problems, currently only works for 2x2 tables. Second, ecological regression is the wrong technique for exploring the congruence between the 1945 and the 1990 or 1994 electoral results, since the population statistics for the relevant geographic units may have changed drastically between 1945 and 1990, see Achen and Shively (1995: 35, fn. 5). To preserve a common methodology among the pre- and post-communist comparison and the 1990/1994 comparisons I thus continue to rely on linear regression.

Table 1: Estimated voter loyalties: percentage of 1990 voters who voted for the same party in 1994

	Fábián and Tóth %	Evans and Whitefield %
MSZP	85	95
SZDSZ	37	41
MDF	15	38
FKGP	41	61
KDNP	39	56
FIDESZ	19	56

Can I expect the overall national-level electoral discontinuity of MSZP and MDF and the stability of the other parliamentary parties to hold at the settlement level? The regression slope coefficient is an estimate of how much of the 1994 vote a party gets for a given increase in the 1990 vote. A reasonable guess of the average congruence achieved by a party is thus the estimated fraction of its 1990 voters that remained loyal in 1994. That is, if differences in defection and recruitment of voters across settlements more or less cancel each other out, then the aggregate relationship between the 1990 and 1994 vote should reflect the magnitude of individual-level congruence.

As regards aggregate congruence I would expect absolute magnitudes to be closer to zero than to one for all parties. The 1990 election, the baseline against which congruence is being measured, came too soon after the collapse of the party-state for parties to have sunk very deep roots into society (Bruszt and Stark, 1992), or for voters to have formulated clear preferences other than the desire to oust the communists. I would thus expect a certain amount of mobility among parties, as voters discover their real preferences.

However, within this overall lower range not all parties should exhibit equally low congruence. Consider KDNP and FKGP. In Western Europe there is evidence that parties relying on local organizations and satellite institutions to mobilize targeted constituencies are more likely to exhibit electoral stability than those that do not (Houska, 1985). On this criterion I expect KDNP and FKGP, which among parliamentary parties rely most heavily on such institutional strategies of political mobilization (Enyedi, 1995; Körösenyi, in this volume), to enjoy the most stability. This expectation is strengthened when I consider that both parties identify themselves as the legitimate successors to pre-communist parties. To the extent this identity is recognized within the electorate I expect ties to these parties to be stronger than ties to the new parties. For FKGP,

however, there are elements of uncertainty. One is the "Torgyán factor." The FKGP president's populist rhetoric may have succeeded in attracting new voters, but it also may have repelled older loyalists who recalled the party's moderate center-right pre-communist predecessor. Another element of uncertainty concerns the declining significance of the land reprivatization issue. In 1990, those seeking to reclaim their land may have voted in large numbers for FKGP, regardless of any sympathies for other parties. By 1994, however, the restitution issue had receded in importance (having been resolved), thus perhaps freeing some of these people to vote for other parties. This may be why Gazsó and Stumpf (1995) find that among all parties FKGP relies the most on interest voting. Based on these uncertainties in the loyalties of FKGP voters we would hypothesize FKGP stability as being somewhat lower than that of KDNP.

Change in MSZP and MDF support should be the most discontinuous across settlements. As the primary beneficiary (MSZP) and victim (MDF) of dissatisfaction with the transition, the fortunes of these parties should be particularly sensitive to regional and local differences in the burden of economic, social, and political reform. For example, we would not expect the evolution of these parties' support to be the same in the depressed industrial towns of the Northeast as in the relatively prosperous communities in the Northwest. The MSZP's transformation from pariah to savior between the two elections also suggests discontinuity. As the primary successor to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party of the state-socialist era, MSZP suffered in 1990 from widespread anti-communist sentiment not just in the traditionally anti-communist regions of the Catholic West, but also in the historically more left-leaning counties in the Southeast. We would expect the magnitude of the rebound in 1994 to be larger in areas of socialist sympathy than elsewhere. For MDF, an additional force for discontinuity was the dramatic evolution of the party itself, having shed its far-right and liberal elements to become an ideologically more homogeneous party of the center-right.

For SZDSZ, possessing neither the organizational strength of KDNP and FKGP nor the savior or villain images acquired by MSZP and MDF, we can only expect middling levels of stability. FIDESZ like SZDSZ, not particularly benefiting or suffering from voter frustration with the transition, but possessing the weakest party organization (Körösenyi, op. cit.), should exhibit more discontinuity than SZDSZ, though perhaps not as much as MDF and MSZP. Expectations of both average and aggregate congruence are presented in Table 2. Survey data estimates of the percentage of 1990 voters who remained loyal to the same party in 1994 (see Table 1) are used as hypothesized average congruence. Aggregate congruence, the  $R^2$  in each regression, measures how well

knowing the 1990 vote helps in predicting the 1994 vote. The expected values, expressed here ordinally, are distilled from the preceding discussion.

The results of the bivariate regression of 1994 vote fraction on 1990 vote fraction for each parliamentary party are presented in Table 3. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are significant at  $p < .01$ .

For all parties the large constants in relation to overall national results well illustrate how far the actual data depart from the ideal of perfect continuity laid out above. These constants indicate that a major portion of the 1994 vote for all parties can be accounted for without any reference to the 1990 vote. Each party in effect receives a boost equal to its constant before the effects of 1990 are even calculated. This will account for most of the vote in areas where a result was low in 1990.

Table 2: Hypothesized average and aggregate congruence

	Average congruence	Aggregate congruence
MSZP	.85	lowest
SZDSZ	.37	medium
MDF	.15	lowest
FKGP	.41	medium-high
KDNP	.39	highest
FIDESZ	.19	low-medium

Table 3: Bivariate regression of 1994 vote on 1990 vote

	MSZP	SZDSZ	MDF	FKGP	KDNP	FIDESZ
Vote 1990	.84 (.02)	.35 (.01)	.18 (.01)	.31 (.01)	.51 (.01)	.20 (.02)
Constant	.21 (.003)	.11 (.002)	.08 (.002)	.07 (.002)	.05 (.002)	.06 (.001)
$R^2$	.27	.24	.10	.26	.50	.04
N	3033	3033	3033	3033	2470	3033

Estimates of the average congruence (the vote 1990 coefficient) conform very well with expectation. Comparing the vote 1990 coefficient estimates with their

hypothesized values, we see that only in the case of the FKGP and KDNP do the two differ by more than a reasonable amount, allowing for error. There are at least two reasons why FKGP and KDNP values might diverge from expectation. First, the assumption that differences in voter recruitment and defection across settlements will cancel each other out could be untenable. If KDNP recruits typically exceeded defectors, for example, then the vote 1990 coefficient would be higher than hypothesized. Second, it could be that the estimated voter loyalties for these two parties are incorrect. As we saw in the discussion of aggregate congruence, there is some ground for believing FKGP and KDNP stabilities should be higher than individual voter loyalties would indicate. However, despite these criticisms the overall correspondence between the estimated average congruence and the survey-based voter loyalties dramatically increase our confidence that the latter accurately reflect true underlying mobilities.

Aggregate congruence conforms only weakly with expectation. FIDESZ and MDF are correctly predicted to exhibit lower congruence, though their ordering should be reversed. KDNP is likewise correctly predicted to display the highest aggregate congruence. Far more than any other party it achieved in fact across settlements the level of continuity indicated by its average congruence. However, MSZP, SZDSZ, and FKGP, predicted to have low, medium, and high aggregated congruence respectively, have roughly equivalent values of  $R^2$ . One reason for the higher than expected MSZP congruence may lie in its better than average performance in industrial and mining regions in 1990, but this can only be confirmed through further testing. The lower than expected aggregate continuity exhibited by FKGP suggests, at the very least, that the hypothesized factors of instability may outweigh the party's organizational efforts.

One of the problems with national-level regressions is that while they may express underlying central tendencies that characterize the country as a whole, they can also mask potentially significant regional variations (Dogan and Derivry, 1988). Marked geographical variation characterizes both the 1990 and 1994 outcomes (Biró, 1994; Körösnéyi, 1992a). Is there concomitant high regional congruence behind the generally low national level congruence? To explore this question the same set of six regressions was run for each of Hungary's 19 counties. A detailed discussion of the regional idiosyncracies in Hungarian electoral behavior is beyond the scope of this contribution. Here I provide only a summary of the scope of continuities and discontinuities. For clarity of presentation only the aggregate congruence ( $R^2$ ) for each party is listed in Table 4. Detailed results can be found in Table II of the Annex.

Table 4: Ranges of aggregate congruence across counties

	MSZP	SZDSZ	MDF	FKGP	KDNP	FIDESZ
$R^2$	.10-.46	0-.51	0-.37	.22-.46	.22-.73	0-.20

Here we see that the greatest territorial diversity is displayed by SZDSZ and KDNP, with a difference of approximately 0.5 between the minimum and maximum congruence. FIDESZ and FKGP are the most geographically homogeneous. FIDESZ's maximum congruence of only .2 (lower than the *minimum* for FKGP and KDNP) indicates that nowhere did it succeed in creating a stable constituency out of its 1990 vote. MSZP and MDF have more territorial homogeneity than would appear in the table. If we discount the county with maximum congruence for MDF and the two with the largest congruence for MSZP, then the diversity displayed by these parties is not much greater than that of FIDESZ or FKGP.

Despite the general geographic uniformity of the congruence, however, there are some noteworthy regional continuities and discontinuities. Referring to the detailed results in Table II of the Annex, we see that the KDNP congruence is greater than .5 in seven counties, located in the North and Northwest. FKGP congruence exceeded .4 in two counties, while SZDSZ's reached that level in three counties. Both KDNP and FKGP enjoyed their highest congruence in Pest county, where fully 73 per cent of the 1994 KDNP vote could be accounted for by the 1990 vote. On the other hand, in Baranya county no party had a congruence higher than .24; the SZDSZ's, MDF's, and FIDESZ's were virtually zero.

The study of electoral congruence at the level of individual parties presupposes that parties are the primary locus of popular loyalty. However, congruence can also be measured with reference to political blocs. It has become conventional to identify leftist, liberal, and Christian-national camps within the Hungarian party system. Continuities in support for these tendencies would constitute evidence of electoral loyalties that lie beneath fealty to individual parties. Congruence for a bloc that is greater than that of any of that bloc's constituent parties means that those parties, if they lost votes at all, lost them to one another rather than to another bloc. Because some of the smaller parties ran in only one of the two post-communist elections, membership in the 1994 and 1990 blocs will not be identical. Among the larger parties that competed in both elections SZDSZ and FIDESZ belong to the liberal bloc; MSZP, the Workers' Party and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary belong to the leftist bloc; and MDF, FKGP and KDNP belong to the Christian-national bloc. A full listing of the bloc memberships is given in List II of the Annex.

The electoral mobility percentages provided by survey data suggest that there should not be much bloc-level continuity (cf., Fábíán and Tóth, 1996). Every parliamentary party lost more votes to MSZP than to any other party. In fact, the proportions are so lopsided that this would probably remain true even if we discount the recall bias in favor of MSZP. For the Christian-national parties, even the second most popular choice of disloyal voters does not indicate bloc loyalty. MDF lost twice as many voters to SZDSZ as to either FKGP or KDNP (12 per cent vs. 6 per cent). FKGP lost more votes to SZDSZ (8 per cent) than to MDF (7 per cent) or KDNP (4 per cent). KDNP voters preferred MDF (12 per cent), but lost twice as many votes to FIDESZ as it did to FKGP (6 per cent vs. 3 per cent). For the liberal bloc, the data suggests somewhat more bloc continuity. FIDESZ voters preferred SZDSZ far more than any other party (17 per cent, only defection to MSZP being higher). However, SZDSZ voters preferred FIDESZ and KDNP in equal proportions (6 per cent), and this was only slightly greater than their preference for FKGP and MDF (5 per cent each). The leftist bloc is dominated by MSZP, which enjoyed 85 per cent voter loyalty. I have no electoral mobility data for the non-parliamentary Marxist-Leninist Workers' Party and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. However, whoever voted for these parties in 1990, when anti-socialist feeling was at its peak, was likely expressing more than just a temporary political preference. It is thus improbable that in 1994 these voters, if they voted at all, would vote outside the bloc.

The results of bivariate regressions of 1994 vote on 1990 vote for each of the three blocs, displayed with the party results in Table II of the Annex, are consistent with the expectations discussed above. For the country as a whole the  $R^2$  for the leftist bloc, at 39 per cent, is greater than that for MSZP, at 27 per cent. The  $R^2$  of 37 per cent for the Christian-national bloc is smaller than the 50 per cent found for KDNP, so in national terms we have little evidence of Christian-national continuity. The liberal result is, as expected, middling, with an  $R^2$  equaling that of SZDSZ alone, at 24 per cent. Here there is more evidence of continuity than for the Christian-national bloc but less than for the leftists.

Comparing blocs and their parties in each of the 19 counties corroborates the above findings, but also indicates the presence of regional continuity. Leftist continuity was greater than MSZP continuity in 18 of 19 counties. Liberal continuity exceeded that of SZDSZ and FIDESZ in nine counties. Christian-national continuity exceeded that of its constituent parties in six counties. Liberal congruence, though typically weak in absolute terms (the  $R^2$ ), is most prevalent in Northwest Hungary. Christian-national congruence is concentrated in parts of the West and Southeast.

Given the extent of aggregate electoral instability between 1990 and 1994 it is still too early to tell where support for blocs or parties will ultimately stabi-

lize. After 40 years of state-socialism we should not expect political identifications to solidify overnight. The preceding analysis has shown, however, that some electoral preferences may be less fluid than survey data would indicate. The extraordinarily high congruence exhibited by KDNP, as well as significant regional continuities found for other parties and blocs, all belie the image of the post-communist electorate as lacking stable political preferences.

Whatever stable loyalties do exist are unlikely to have been created *de novo* since 1989. The Hungarian republic is still young, and party organizations, weak to begin with, have not had sufficient time to cement widespread mass allegiance. It is more plausible to suppose that these preferences already existed, if perhaps latently, during the communist period. Very little is known about the distribution of such preferences in Hungary under state-socialism. Although some analysts attempted to identify common tendencies such as social-democratism and conservatism (e.g., Gombár, 1983; Schöpflin, 1979), in the absence of opinion polling or free multi-party elections there was no way of determining the degree or distribution of support for any given orientation. If historical correlates of contemporary behavior exist at all, they must be sought in the pre-communist period.

### Electoral Trends, 1945-1994

The last detailed snapshot we have of Hungarian electoral behavior consists of the results of the 1945 and 1947 national parliamentary elections. Though neither of these elections was both free and fair, they nonetheless offered the opportunity to express a wide range of political preferences. The 1945 election was fair but not free. Held in November 1945, only months after the end of World War II, this election was organized under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission, and only "democratic" parties were permitted to participate. In practice this meant the exclusion of most of the pre-war right-wing parties and most parties that did not participate in the Hungarian National Independence Front, an alliance that opposed fascism during the war. As a result the right end of the political spectrum was represented solely by the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), which won 57 per cent of the popular vote. Most of the rest of the vote went to the parties classified here as leftist: the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), the Social Democratic Party (SZDP), and the National Peasant Party (NPP). Together these parties garnered 41.2 per cent of the vote.

The 1947 election was generally free but not fair. In comparison with 1945 there was greater political party participation. Four more right-wing parties took part: the Democratic People's Party (DNP), the Hungarian Independence Party

(MFP), the Independent Hungarian Democratic Party (FMDP), and the Christian Women's Camp (KNT). Only fascist parties were still prohibited. At the same time, however, the period before the election was marred by communist intimidation. Many non-communist party leaders fled into exile; others were arrested and deported. Moreover, the election results themselves, presented below in Table 5, are biased by the fraudulent votes known to have been cast for the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), the exclusion of voters alleged to have ties to fascism, and doubts about whether the votes were counted properly. Although the largest estimate of the number of fraudulent votes (just over 200,000) is a relatively small fraction of the nearly 5,000,000 valid votes, the results should still be read cautiously.<sup>3</sup> The reported outcome of MKP may be as much as 20 per cent too high, while totals for the other parties may each be too low by a few percentage points. Significantly, the difference between the 1945 and the 1947 support for rightist parties (5.2 per cent) is very nearly the same as the increase in the MKP vote (5.4 per cent). The "R" and "L" in parentheses after each party name indicates whether it has been classified as left or right (i.e., Christian-national).

Table 5: Published results of the 1945 and 1947 elections

Party	1945		1947	
	Vote	%	Vote	%
FKGP (R)	2,697,503	57.0	769,763	15.4
SZDP (L)	823,314	17.4	744,641	14.9
MKP (L)	802,122	16.9	1,113,050	22.3
NPP (L)	325,284	6.9	415,465	8.3
PDP	76,424	1.6	50,294	1.0
MRP	5,762	0.2	84,169	1.7
DNP (R)			820,453	16.4
MFP (R)			670,547	13.4
FMDP (R)			260,420	5.2
KNT (R)			69,536	1.4

Source: Vida (1986: 280). Party abbreviations are identified in List I of the Annex.

3 For a discussion of the electoral fraud committed during the 1947 parliamentary election, see Szerencsés (1992).

As with the 1990 and 1994 outcomes congruence between 1945 and 1994 will be explored through regression analysis. Only regressions with the 1945 results are presented here because the unreliability of the 1947 outcomes outweighs the fact that that election was held later and involved greater party political articulation. Moreover, I investigate trends in support for blocs rather than for individual parties, rendering less important the restrictions on right-wing parties in 1945. The reason why parties are not compared is that it is not clear which pre- and post-communist parties should be paired up. This is most problematic in the cases of MDF, SZDSZ and FIDESZ which make no claim to be historic parties. They have no obvious predecessors. As the successor to the old state-socialist MSZMP (and before that its 1948-56 predecessor, the MDP), MSZP is the descendant of a merger between the communist MKP and the social democratic SZDP. Its organizational precursor is thus also ambiguous. Even for the historic parties the situation is indefinite. The predecessor of KDNP, the István Barankovics-led DNP, contested only the 1947 election, hardly a distinguished party tradition. Among parliamentary parties only FKGP has a long pedigree. Thus, the present discussion will be limited to congruence between the pre- and post-communist leftist and Christian-national blocs. The parties comprising each of these blocs in 1945 and 1947 are listed along with membership in the 1990 and 1994 blocs in List II of the Annex. For the remainder of this contribution I will use "rightist," "right-wing," "the right," and "Christian-national" interchangeably. Likewise, "leftist," "the left" and "left-wing" will be used interchangeably.

The following analysis must be interpreted with a great deal of care. First, in order to account for the spatial development of settlements over time the 1945 data were often aggregated to reflect settlement spread as it existed on January 1, 1990. This information is provided by the Central Statistical Office in the 1973, 1985 and 1990 Directory of Place Names (*Helységnévtár*). Thus, for example, the 1945 data for the city of Pécs do not reflect the Pécs that existed at that time, but the 1945-era Pécs, plus all the surrounding villages that would comprise Pécs in 1990. Thus, a data point in a regression may represent not just one settlement in 1945, but a cluster of settlements that would later merge into one settlement by 1990. Second, no account has been made of any in- and out-migration that a given settlement experienced between 1945 and 1990. Thus, while a given data point may represent a cluster of villages at two different points in time, in the absence of contextual information about a particular settlement cluster no inference can be made about the behavioral mechanisms underlying any trend observed. For example, both the growth of cities and the concomitant depopulation of rural areas as well as the expulsion of ethnic Germans and resettlement of ethnic Hungarians after World War II render problematic any inference from aggregate-level continuity to individual or

within-family continuities. Third, in the absence of theories that make specific predictions regarding magnitudes of continuity or discontinuity, congruence should be evaluated across settlements and with regard to values that can reasonably be expected after a four-decade interruption rather than to some rigid standard. Finally, the classification of parties into blocs with the same label in both 1945/1947 and 1990/1994 does not imply that the Christian-national and leftist blocs have not changed between the pre- and post-communist periods. A detailed discussion of how such change can be incorporated into the study of electoral transformation, however, shall not be attempted here (but see Wittenberg, 1997).

In spite of these caveats a detailed comparison of pre- and post-communist electoral results is rewarding. It provides an outline of the ways in which Hungarian political preferences were transformed during the state-socialist period, yielding a trace of the political trajectory followed by a given settlement, district, or county. It permits an investigation into the regional variations in state-socialist penetration into society, pointing both to localities where the communists were successful in recasting political preferences and to areas where they never managed to loosen the hold of inherited attitudes. The results are thus an empirical record both of general trends in the way Hungarian partisanship was remade and of peculiarities in the way socialism was experienced in particular settlements.

In the aggregate the Christian-national bloc lost more support than the leftists between pre- and post-communism. Even in 1990, with leftist support at a low point, the right captured only 43 per cent of the vote, as against 57 per cent in 1945. Although the left in 1990 fell well short of the roughly 40 per cent of the vote it received in the 1940s, in 1994 (when vote for the right was perhaps abnormally low), it did succeed in attaining its pre-communist results, capturing 37 per cent. Even assuming that the true underlying support for the left is somewhere in between its 1990 and its 1994 outcome, this is still better relative to its pre-communist results than contemporary Christian-national support is relative to pre-communist rightist support.

The transformation of the Christian-national and leftist constituencies between pre- and post-communism is clearly bound up with the emergence since 1989 of a liberal bloc claiming roughly one-third of the popular vote. At first glance the greater losses suffered by the right and the strength of SZDSZ in the former Catholic strongholds of western Hungary suggest that liberal strength is disproportionately composed of former right-wing affiliated areas. In fact, however, the liberal support base has emerged fairly uniformly both in formerly loyal leftist areas and in formerly loyal Christian-national areas. In the 124 most Christian-national settlements of 1945 and 1947 (places where the vote for that

bloc was in the highest decile among vote fractions ranked in each of those years), the liberal bloc garnered 30 per cent of the vote in 1990 as against 35 per cent nationally. Likewise, in 1994 it received 28 per cent of the vote against 32 per cent nationally. Thus, it slightly underperformed in the formerly most loyal Christian-national settlements. In the 150 most leftist settlements in 1945 and 1947, the liberals got 38 per cent and 33 per cent in 1990 and 1994, respectively. This is only marginally better than their national averages. It thus appears that both the leftist and Christian-national camps have "donated" significant support to the liberal bloc. A similar conclusion may be drawn if we examine contemporary liberal strongholds and look back to see how they voted in 1945 and 1947. In those settlements that ranked in the top 20 per cent in liberal vote in both 1990 and 1994 (i.e., in the ninth and tenth deciles) both the leftist and Christian-national blocs performed roughly at their national averages for both 1945 and 1947.

Significant electoral continuity has been found between the 1990 result and pre-communist outcomes (Kolosi et. al., 1992; Körösenyi, 1992b; Wiener, 1997). By contrast the 1994 result is seen as a radical departure, or left turn, from previous Hungarian experience. The following argument reverses these conclusions. In fact, it is the 1994 not the 1990 election that exhibits the most continuity with the past. Bivariate regressions of the 1994 and 1990 vote on the 1945 outcome for both the Christian-national and leftist blocs show this. For each bloc two regressions were run, one for 1994 and one for 1990. The values of  $R^2$  for these regressions are displayed below in Table 6.

Table 6: Aggregate congruence between 1990/1994 and 1945 ( $R^2$ )

Elections correlated	Christian-national	Leftist
1994 and 1945	0.15	0.11
1990 and 1945	0.07	0.06

Reading down each of the columns we see that the 1994 congruence is greater than the 1990 for both the Christian-national and the leftist blocs. The 1994 outcome is approximately twice as congruent with the 1945 result for both blocs. This conclusion holds in 16 of 19 counties for the Christian-national bloc and in nine of 19 counties for the leftist bloc. In terms of electoral support the Christian-national triumph in 1990 appears to be the historical anomaly.

Although we can say that the 1994 election was clearly more a return to tradition than the 1990, the magnitudes of congruence are rather low. Only 15 per

cent of the 1994 Christian-national outcome can be accounted for by reference to the 1945 result, and that is the highest congruence. The reason for the low magnitudes lies in the way political competition has changed between the two periods. Among the deepest transformations in Hungarian electoral behavior since the 1940s has been the penetration of Hungarian settlements by competing political blocs. Whereas before state-socialism communities tended to be dominated by a particular bloc or even by a single party, today settlements tend to divide their support more equally among the rival blocs. In this sense for the country as a whole partisan transformation can be characterized more as discontinuous than as continuous. Consider first areas formerly dominated by Christian-national parties, primarily smaller communities. Hungarian villages, still mostly conservative and religious in the 1940s, were the backbone of the old Christian-national constituency. Roughly 41 per cent of approximately 2,900 settlements gave greater than 75 per cent of their vote to the right in 1945. In 14 per cent of the settlements support surpassed 90 per cent. This phenomenon is particularly vivid in the predominantly Catholic western Dunántúl, where the settlements tend to be smaller than elsewhere, but it also characterizes northern Hungary. By the 1990s, however, the right no longer predominated in areas where it had formerly held sway. Only 24 per cent of all settlements gave more than 75 per cent support to the right in 1945 and more than 50 per cent in either 1990 or 1994. Right-wing support exceeded 75 per cent in both 1945 and either 1990 or 1994 in just 2 per cent of all settlements. This represents a drastic decline in the number of right-wing dominated communities. Christian-national support in 1990 or 1994 was greater than 1945 right-wing support in just 18 per cent of all settlements. Even here the increases tend to be in settlements where the right had been historically weak. The average 1945 right-wing vote share in these settlements was only 44 per cent, compared with 69 per cent nationally.

The fate of the old leftist constituency is similar to that of the old Christian-national in that the left has lost support in areas where it was formerly dominant. Of the settlements that gave more than 50 per cent of their support to the left in 1945 (8 per cent of all communities), only 5 per cent gave more of their vote to the left in 1994 than in 1945. Thus, the left lost its leading position in 95 per cent of its former strongholds. However, the left had greater success than the Christian-national bloc in penetrating settlements where it formerly exercised little sway. Between 1945 and 1994 the left increased its vote in 76 per cent of all settlements. In 90 per cent of these the left got less than half the vote in 1945. Even the 1990 leftist vote was greater than the 1945 vote in 37 per cent of the settlements.

The left's greater ability to penetrate formerly anti-leftist areas can also be seen in Table 6. Reading the top row of the table we see that in 1994 the

Christian-national congruence of .15 was greater than that for the left at .11. There is thus more congruence between the pre- and post-communist Christian-national bloc than between the pre- and post-communist leftist bloc. This result holds in 17 of 19 counties. In eight of these, located in the north and northwest, the difference in congruence is substantial. Detailed regression results are presented in Table III of the Annex.

The different trajectories followed by the Christian-national and leftist blocs between pre- and post-communism are understandable given their relative strengths in the late 1940s and the differential pressures to which each of the old blocs was exposed during state-socialism. Because the Christian-national bloc was stronger than the leftist in the pre-communist period, it would have had to secure a higher level of support during post-communism in order to preserve its former position. In other words, the baseline against which improvements in 1990/1994 are measured is higher in the case of the right than it is in the case of the left.

The pressures exerted on the Christian-national constituency during state-socialism were also quite different from those encountered by the leftist support base. The persecution of religious organizations, the encouragement of socialist values and scorn of bourgeois nationalist beliefs, the proletarianization of large portions of the rural workforce, and unrelenting secularization and urbanization removed many people from the orbit of Christian-national influence. Pressures on the old leftist bloc were of a different sort. To the extent that the mass organizations and resocialization efforts introduced by the Hungarian communists failed to secure the leftist loyalty of those who were already sympathizers before the advent of state-socialism, the dissolution of voluntary civil organizations in the late 1940s would have adversely affected the left as well. Many other committed leftists were disillusioned by the brutal suppression of the 1956 uprising. Yet, the old left-wing strongholds in mining and industrial areas received relatively favorable treatment by the communist authorities. Many incentives offered during the state-socialist period, material and otherwise, were intended to reinforce rather than weaken loyalty to the left.

## Conclusions

The analysis presented above largely confirms for both parties and blocs the overall national-level instabilities in voting behavior found through survey research. With the exception of KDNP, relative electoral continuity at the national level does appear to be little more than a felicitous sum of otherwise discontinuous results at the settlement level. However, the regression results also

revealed regional continuities. Christian-national congruence exceeded that of MDF, FKGP and KDNP in nearly a third of all counties. Liberal congruence exceeded that of SZDSZ and FIDESZ in nearly half of all counties. This suggests the existence of attachments more deeply held than loyalties to particular parties.

The contribution has also shown that the 1994 outcome, though more a return to tradition than the 1990 result, can in the aggregate be understood largely without reference to history in the form of earlier electoral results. Even the 1990 results account for less than half of the 1994 variation. The reasons for this lie in the trajectories undergone by the Christian-national and leftist blocs during the profound social, economic and political upheavals of the last half century. Socialist penetration of the old Christian-national constituency and the emergence of liberalism out of fragments of both the left and the right have led to overall discontinuity between pre- and post-communism at the national level. Only regional continuities persist.

In the absence of contextual information about a given area the precise mechanisms underlying regional continuities or discontinuities will remain unknown. The electoral data depict the endpoints of the path, but not the route followed. In this sense the present investigation represents the beginning rather than the end of a quest to understand the historical evolution of Hungarian electoral preferences.

## Annex

### List I: Abbreviations and the Parties to Which They Refer

#### 1990-1994:

MSZP	-	Hungarian Socialist Party
SZDSZ	-	Alliance of Free Democrats
MDF	-	Hungarian Democratic Forum
FKGP	-	Independent Smallholders' Party
KDNP	-	Christian Democratic People's Party
FIDESZ	-	Alliance of Young Democrats

#### 1945-1947:

FKGP	-	Independent Smallholders' Party
MKP	-	Hungarian Communist Party
DNP	-	Democratic People's Party
SZDP	-	Social Democratic Party
MFP	-	Hungarian Independence Party

NPP	-	National Peasant Party
FMDP	-	Independent Hungarian Democratic Party
MRP	-	Hungarian Radical Party
KNT	-	Christian Women's Camp
PDP	-	Civic Democratic Party

### List II: The Members of the Leftist, Liberal and Christian-national Blocs

Leftist 1994: Hungarian Socialist Party, Worker's Party, Social Democratic Party of Hungary.

Liberal 1994: Alliance of Free Democrats, Alliance of Young Democrats, Entrepreneur's Party, Republican Party.

Christian-national 1994: Hungarian Democratic Forum, Independent Smallholders' Party, Christian Democratic People's Party, Compromise Independent Smallholders' Party, United Smallholders' Party, Hungarian Truth and Justice Party, Conservative Party.

Leftist 1990: Hungarian Socialist Party, Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (later the Worker's Party), Social Democratic Party of Hungary.

Liberal 1990: Alliance of Free Democrats, Alliance of Young Democrats, Entrepreneur's Party.

Christian-national 1990: Hungarian Democratic Forum, Independent Smallholders' Party, Christian Democratic People's Party, National Smallholders' Party, Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, Somogy Christian Coalition, Freedom Party, Hungarian Independence Party.

Leftist 1947: Hungarian Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, National Peasant Party.

Christian-national 1947: Independent Smallholders' Party, Democratic People's Party, Hungarian Independence Party, Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, Christian Women's Camp.

Leftist 1945: Hungarian Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, National Peasant Party.

Christian-national 1945: Independent Smallholders' Party.

Table I: Deviations between the database and the official results

Party	(List) 1994 Database		(List) 1994 Official	
	Vote	(%)	Vote	(%)
MSZP	1,759,828	32.98	1781504	32.99
SZDSZ	1,054,436	19.16	1065889	19.74
MDF	626,629	11.74	633770	11.74
FKGP	469,492	8.80	476272	8.82
KDNP	374,623	7.02	379523	7.03
FIDESZ	374,872	7.02	379,344	7.02

  

Party	(List) 1990 Database		(List) 1990 Official	
	Vote	(%)	Vote	(%)
MSZP	531,237	10.90	535,064	10.89
SZDSZ	1,042,997	21.39	1,050,799	21.39
MDF	1,205,570	24.73	1,214,359	24.73
FKGP	573,110	11.75	576,315	11.73
KDNP	313,097	6.42	317,278	6.46
FIDESZ	436,436	8.95	439,649	8.95

  

Party	1947 Database		1947 Published	
	Vote	(%)	Vote	(%)
MKP	1,078,714	23.12	1,112,990	22.3
SZDP	701,146	15.06	744,671	14.9
FKGP	748,989	16.08	769,580	15.4
DNP	768,623	16.50	820,453	16.4
KNT	63,677	1.37	69,586	1.4
PDP	48,386	1.04	50,374	1.0
NPP	409,116	8.78	415,465	8.3
FMDP	208,502	4.48	260,411	5.2
MFP	664,798	14.27	670,547	13.4
MRP	83,711	1.80	89,179	1.7

Source: Izsák (1983).

Table I: (continuation)

Party	1945 Database		1945 Published	
	Vote	(%)	Vote	(%)
FKGP	2,686,450	57.37	2,697,503	57.30
SZDP	820,446	17.52	823,314	17.41
MKP	799,165	17.06	802,122	16.95
NPP	322,987	6.90	325,284	6.87
PDP	76,219	1.63	76,424	1.62
MRP	5,757	0.12	5,762	0.12

Source: Vida (1986).

Table II: Regression of 1994 vote fraction on 1990 vote fraction, for each parliamentary party and bloc by county

County	MSZP	SZDSZ	MDF	FKGP	KDNP	Fid	Left	Lib	Chr/Nat
Baranya (N=294):									
Slope:	.85	.09*	.07*	.24	.74	.20	.71	.13	.30
Constant:	.22	.17	.09	.06	.04	.05	.24	.23	.20
R <sup>2</sup> :	.17	.005	.008	.24	.22	.04	.21	.02	.10
Bács (N=116):									
Slope:	1.04	.39	.33	.36	.51	.18*	.98	.44	.52
Constant:	.18	.09	.06	.06	.06	.05	.17	.12	.14
R <sup>2</sup> :	.25	.35	.37	.37	.27	.02	.38	.34	.44
Borsod (N=343):									
Slope:	.46	.29	.13	.32	.57	.11*	.61	.30	.51
Constant:	.27	.09	.09	.05	.05	.06	.25	.15	.12
R <sup>2</sup> :	.13	.19	.05	.22	.54	.002	.26	.14	.28
Csongrád (N=58):									
Slope:	.72	.12*	.09	.31	.51	-.04*	.73	.19	.47
Constant:	.21	.15	.07	.11	.05	.07	.22	.22	.10
R <sup>2</sup> :	.23	.03	.05	.27	.22	-.02	.41	.09	.43



Table III: Regression of 1994 and 1990 vote fractions on 1945 vote fraction, for left and right blocs

County	Left Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Left Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945
Baranya:				
Slope:	.01*	.03*	.05*	.09
Constant:	.34	.31	.14	.41
R <sup>2</sup> :	0	.002	.005	.01
	(N=280)	(N=277)	(N=280)	(N=277)
Bács (N=83):				
Slope:	.19	.28	.14	.34
Constant:	.26	.22	.10	.27
R <sup>2</sup> :	.07	.21	.11	.16
Békés:				
Slope:	.10*	.14	.07	.02*
Constant:	.36	.27	.18	.45
R <sup>2</sup> :	.03	.05	.05	.001
	(N=55)	(N=55)	(N=54)	(N=54)
Borsod:				
Slope:	.32	.29	.10	.14
Constant:	.30	.16	.19	.37
R <sup>2</sup> :	.21	.20	.02	.04
	(N=333)	(N=332)	(N=333)	(N=332)
Csongrád (N=36):				
Slope:	.07*	.033 *	.12	.06*
Constant:	.31	.34	.10	.53
R <sup>2</sup> :	.02	.01	.18	.02
Fejér:				
Slope:	.16	.25	.13	.25
Constant:	.31	.17	.13	.24
R <sup>2</sup> :	.05	.12	.04	.07
	(N=93)	(N=93)	(N=92)	(N=92)

Table III: (continuation)

County	Left Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Left Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945
Győr:				
Slope:	.09	.24	.03*	.21
Constant:	.25	.24	.12	.35
R <sup>2</sup> :	.02	.20	0	.09
	(N=151)	(N=149)	(N=151)	(N=149)
Hajdú (N=71):				
Slope:	.07*	.22	.07*	.20
Constant:	.39	.20	.19	.30
R <sup>2</sup> :	.01	.16	.004	.08
Heves (N=103):				
Slope:	.14	.14	.16	.15
Constant:	.35	.23	.17	.38
R <sup>2</sup> :	.05	.06	.06	.03
Szolnok:				
Slope:	.13	.17	.19	.10*
Constant:	.36	.21	.14	.36
R <sup>2</sup> :	.07	.10	.15	.004
	(N=59)	(N=59)	(N=58)	(N=58)
Komárom (N=65):				
Slope:	.16	.25	.12	.22
Constant:	.32	.18	.06	.34
R <sup>2</sup> :	.12	.36	.33	.19
Nógrád:				
Slope:	.37	.26	.31	.34
Constant:	.26	.22	.11	.30
R <sup>2</sup> :	.50	.23	.51	.31
	(N=115)	(N=114)	(N=115)	(N=114)

Table III: (continuation)

County	Left Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Left Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945
Pest (N=153):				
Slope:	.18	.28	.04	.31
Constant:	.26	.20	.11	.32
R <sup>2</sup> :	.16	.26	.01	.18
Somogy (N=225):				
Slope:	.28	.27	.29	.31
Constant:	.36	.14	.18	.22
R <sup>2</sup> :	.05	.10	.07	.08
Szabolcs:				
Slope:	.18	.17	.10	.04*
Constant:	.33	.25	.14	.46
R <sup>2</sup> :	.04 (N=205)	.06 (N=203)	.02 (N=205)	.002 (N=203)
Tolna (N=103):				
Slope:	.06*	-.11	.076*	.004*
Constant:	.31	.43	.13	.52
R <sup>2</sup> :	.007	.03	.009	0
Vas:				
Slope:	.24	.35	.06	.21
Constant:	.21	.14	.08	.35
R <sup>2</sup> :	.08 (N=206)	.15 (N=201)	.02 (N=205)	.05 (N=200)
Veszprém:				
Slope:	.31	.43	.23	.41
Constant:	.22	.10	.11	.24
R <sup>2</sup> :	.14 (N=209)	.25 (N=208)	.10 (N=209)	.17 (N=208)

Table III: (continuation)

County	Left Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1994 on 1945	Left Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945	Right Bloc Regression of 1990 on 1945
Zala:				
Slope:	.17	.23	.02*	.11
Constant:	.24	.30	.10	.48
R <sup>2</sup> :	.05 (N=246)	.07 (N=243)	.003 (N=246)	.01 (N=243)
Total:				
Slope:	.22	.24	.12	.18
Constant:	.29	.21	.13	.36
R <sup>2</sup> :	.11 (N=2,796)	.15 (N=2,778)	.06 (N=2,804)	.07 (N=2,786)

Legend: Slope: 1990 or 1994 vote.

County: Constant.

Sample size: R<sup>2</sup>.

\* Not significant at  $p < .10$ .

(Sample sizes between left and right differ due to missing data.)

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