Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Shadow of the Holocaust

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Two tragedies befell the Jews of Eastern Europe after the outbreak of World War II. The first and by far the best known and exhaustively researched is the Shoah, the Nazi extermination effort. The second, as Żbikowski (1993: 174) eloquently puts it, is “the violent explosion of the latent hatred and hostility of local communities.” This book focuses on the second tragedy, a wave of popular anti-Jewish violence that erupted in summer 1941, in the aftermath of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. With the Soviet army retreating, the German army advancing, and government authority collapsing, civilian populations across hundreds of villages and towns stretching from the Baltic states in the north to Romania in the south committed atrocities against their Jewish neighbors. These often gruesome and sadistic crimes ranged from looting and beatings to public humiliation, rape, torture, and murder. One of the most widely known yet hardly unique such incidents occurred in the town of Jedwabne, Poland on July 10, 1941. In a day-long rampage under the approving eyes of the Germans, Poles committed mass murder. The Jews were ordered to gather in the town square, where among other humiliations they were forced to clean the pavement, smash the monument to Lenin, and hold a mock “religious” funeral on his behalf. Those who attempted to flee were hunted down and clubbed, stoned, knifed, and drowned, their bloodied corpses often left in pits. Apparently dissatisfied with such inefficient methods of murder, the perpetrators herded hundreds of remaining Jews—women, children, the old, and the sick—into a barn that was doused with kerosene and set alight (Gross 2001). Ethnic violence is never easy to comprehend, but it is especially puzzling when the perpetrators are civilians and the victims are their neighbors (Fujii 2009; Straus 2006). This book investigates the reasons for such intimate violence.

The 1941 pogroms are a particularly interesting instance of ethnic violence for two reasons. First, they happened under conditions of state collapse. Many who study ethnic violence emphasize the key role of state elites in orchestrating conflict.
(e.g., Brass 2003; Gagnon 2004; Lambroso 1992; Wilkinson 2004). But state actions cannot explain the 1941 pogroms because the Polish state had all but collapsed by the time they occurred. The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 but did not establish full political authority on Polish territory until at least September (Żbikowski 2007: 315; Snyder 2008: 96). In the period between Soviet and German rule there was no central government in Poland. To the extent anyone was in control it would have been the Germans, but as we argue further below they did not function as a de facto state elite. Although the Germans did try to incite pogroms, they met with only limited success. Pogroms occurred both with and without the Germans being present. Like Kalyvas (2006) and Petersen (2002), we seek to understand ethnic violence under conditions of state collapse such as can occur during periods of war, civil war, regime change, and the collapse of empire.

Second, the scale of the attacks demonstrate that ethnic violence is not an inherent feature of inter-group life in stateless or near stateless societies even with relationships as long-standing and conflictual as those between Jews and non-Jews. Given the long history of restrictions, attacks, and expulsions directed against Jews in Poland, it is easy to believe that non-Jews must have eagerly assaulted their Jewish neighbors when the Nazi onslaught on the Soviet Union presented an opportunity. After all, the Germans were if anything sympathetic to those who wanted to attack Jews, and in the absence of a state the “clouding features of legal restraint” (Petersen 2002: 12) disappeared and people were freer to act on their desires. As Kalyvas (2006: 389) notes in regard to civil wars, chaotic and uncertain circumstances offer “irresistible opportunities to harm everyday enemies.” Where violence did occur it was often quite gruesome, and could include beheading, the chopping off of limbs, rape, and the ripping of fetuses from the wombs of pregnant women.¹

¹The testimonies of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw are filled with such descriptions. The atrocities described in this sentence occurred in a single pogrom. See Faygl Golombek’s testi-
Yet pogroms were relatively rare events. According to our data, in the six regions comprising most of the then eastern Polish borderlands—Białystok, Lwów, Polesie, Stanisławów, Tarnopol, and Wołyń—pogroms occurred in 204 municipalities, comprising just 9 percent of all localities in the region where Jews and non-Jews dwelled together. Most communities never experienced a pogrom and most ordinary non-Jews never attacked Jews. Such a pattern is not limited to Poland. Tolnay and Beck (1995: 45), for example, report that more than one-third of counties in the U.S. South never experienced a lynching. Varshney (2002: 6-7) notes that only eight cities in India accounted for just over 45 percent of all deaths in Hindu-Muslim violence. Our data show that ethnic violence is situational rather than inherent. The task for researchers, one we undertake in this book, is to identify in societies with long histories of animosity the local contexts in which ethnic violence either breaks out or fails to do so.

Why did pogroms occur in some localities but not others? This is our central question. Our results demonstrate that some of the most commonly believed explanations for pogroms do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. The 1941 pogroms were not orchestrated by the state, and in general did not occur where economic competition between Jews and non-Jews was fiercest or where Jews were the most sympathetic to communism. None of these accounts explain the relative rarity of the violence. We find some support for the claim that anti-Semitism was important, but even more for the idea that the pogroms were rooted in competing nationalisms. We contend that the pogroms represented a strategy whereby non-Jews attempted to rid themselves of what they thought would be future political rivals. Pogroms were most likely to occur where there were lots of Jews, where those Jews advocated national equality with non-Jews, and where parties advocating national equality were popular. In the following section we review existing mony AŽIH 301-1858.
explanations for municipality-level variation in ethnic violence, and then expand our own explanation that focuses on political threat.

**Explanations for Pogroms**

**Jewish Collaboration with the Soviet Occupation**

As a consequence of secret protocols to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union, the two countries divided Poland between them. When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939 it remained within its allotted territories in the west. The Soviet Union invaded Poland on September 17, 1939 and occupied the eastern borderlands, the so-called “kresy”, with the intention of incorporating them into the Soviet state. During the roughly two years between the Red Army’s arrival and its retreat in the wake of the June, 1941 Nazi invasion the Soviets ran a brutal occupation regime. The Jewish collaboration hypothesis (e.g., Musiał 2004) posits pogroms as revenge for alleged Jewish support of the Soviet occupation.

This hypothesis is both logically plausible and consistent with some aspects of the historical record. First, although it is impossible to know the entire distribution of attitudes toward Soviet rule on the eve of the occupation, most scholars agree that a common Jewish reaction to the arrival of Soviet soldiers was one of relief. Having experienced open discrimination and not a few pogroms in interwar Poland, Soviet rule, harsh as it might have been expected to be, offered at least the prospect of civic equality. It was certainly preferable to the Nazi rule in western Poland. In the words of Moshe Levin, it was “the lesser of two evils,” a sentiment some Jews were known to have voiced openly. For example, according to Henryk Szyper, whose memoir was written at the time of the occupation, a Jewish director
of a store would say to a Pole who complained, “[t]here is no more free Poland, your time is over. It is our time” (AZIH 301-4654, pp. 46-47). Such attitudes, however rarely expressed, could only have inflamed Poles, for whom the occupation meant the end of national sovereignty.

Second, although all national groups suffered under Soviet rule (collectivization, nationalization, and deportation, for example, touched all corners of society), the de jure removal of barriers that had impeded Jewish integration in interwar Poland meant that the status of Jews increased relative to that of Poles, who were no longer the ruling Staatsnation; and also to that of Ukrainians, whose nationalist aspirations the Soviets brutally repressed. Positions within the Soviet apparatus were in theory as open to Jews as they were to Poles or Ukrainians, and at the lower levels of the administration the regime found many Jews willing to serve. As Brakel (2007) reports in his study of the Baranowicze region in northeast Poland, Jews worked in the Soviet administration, ran for office, were members of the newly created communist youth organization, and were even among those more trusted “vostochniki” brought in from other parts of the Soviet Union to help administer the new territories. The fact that low-level state bureaucrats would have had the most contact with the local non-Jewish populations meant that Jews were visibly associated with the Soviet regime. According to one observer, “[o]ffices and institutions that never saw a Jew on their premises abound now with Jewish personnel of all kinds.” (Cited in Pinchuk 1990, 50.) In the words of Szyper (AZIH 301-4654), an unquestionable achievement of Soviet rule was “factual emancipation and equalization of political citizenship.” For Petersen (2002) Polish and Ukrainian resentment at their relative loss of status was a prime driver of pogrom violence, regardless of whether or not the Jews actively had a hand in the reversal of Polish and Ukrainian fortunes.

Third, there is ample anecdotal evidence that local non-Jewish populations blamed
the Jews for the Soviet occupation. We agree with Żbikowski (2007) that no “uniform pogrom scenario” existed, but eyewitness accounts of how pogroms actually occurred do reveal some recurring themes. One of these is the ritual humiliation of the Jewish victims in ways that clearly associate them with the Soviet regime. For example, in the towns of Kolno and Jedwabne, locals forced the Jews to remove the statue of Lenin and bury it in the ground. In Kolno the Jews then had to sing and pray for the buried monument; in Jedwabne the Jews were subsequently beaten to death and thrown into the same grave.\(^2\) In Siematycze, the Jews had to dismantle the Lenin statue with hammers and sickles.\(^3\) In Radziłów Poles made the Jews sing a Soviet song, *Moskva Moia*, while in Kościelne, as the Lenin statue was being thrown in the water, the Polish police forced a local Jew to give a dictated speech in which, among other things, he said “Lenin, you gave us your life and you give us death, you’ll never rise again.”\(^4\) We know that the perpetrators of many pogroms had previously been incarcerated in (Soviet) NKVD prisons.\(^5\)

Chapters 4 and 5 will investigate how consistent the connection is between where locals believed non-Jews to have collaborated and the distribution of pogroms. Although we have no systematic data by locality on Jewish presence in the Soviet administration, it stands to reason that sympathy for the Soviet regime would be highest where support for communist parties was strongest. Therefore if pogroms were about punishment for collaboration with the Soviet occupation then the probability of a pogrom should be positively related to pre-war communist support. We find no such systematic relationship between pogrom outbreaks and the vote given to communist parties during the interwar period.

We can also challenge the degree to which the locals’ beliefs were warranted

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 335, fn 67.
\(^4\)Ibid, fn 64, 66.
given actual evidence of collaboration. Such a challenge is important because it provides leverage on the crucial issue of perpetrator culpability. The pogroms were barbarous and unlawful, but there is still a difference between punishing those who are guilty of traitorous acts and scapegoating a vulnerable minority for acts it either did not commit or were also committed by members of other groups. In the former case we might condemn the perpetrators for the manner in which punishment was delivered but concur with the principle that treachery deserves punishment. In the latter case the perpetrators are guilty of both inhumane punishment and persecuting the innocent. In fact, a balanced consideration of the historical record casts significant doubt on the Jewish collaboration hypothesis.

First, if part of the humiliation ritual during a pogrom involved having Jews dispose of a Soviet statue, a different part had them assume “Jewish” roles while doing it. In Kolno, for example, the blacksmiths who broke up the Lenin monument had to sing *Hatikvah*, a song that would later become the national anthem of Israel, while doing it. The broken monument was placed on a cart, and other Jews, dressed in prayer shawls, had to pull the cart to the Jewish cemetery for “burial.” In Kościenne it was *Hatikvah*-singing Jews that carried the Lenin statue from the center of town to the river. In Siematyczne all the Jews had to wear prayer shawls while they dismantled the symbols of Soviet rule.

Second, although some Jews certainly collaborated, so did some non-Jews. Indeed, as many have noted, the common non-Jewish perception that most Jews were sympathetic to communism and supported the Soviet occupation, and that most of the collaborators were Jews, is not borne out by actual facts. We do not have numbers to prove this for the kresy as a whole, but regional studies clearly bear this out. Consider, for example, the Białystok voivodship in northeast Poland, which

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7ibid, p. 335, fn 64.  
8ibid., p. 335, fn 67.
according to the 1931 census was roughly 67 percent Polish, 16 percent Belarusian, and 12 percent Jewish (just over 150,000 Jews). According to Jasiewicz (2001: tables 7-16, pp. 1119-1134), in 1940 Jews comprised 1.2 percent of 238 chairpersons of rural committees, 9 percent of 297 people in communist youth organization (Komsomol) management, 5.4 percent of 10045 government candidates, and 4 percent of 8885 (communist party) cadres. Not only are these rates of participation well under the Jewish proportion of the population, but in absolute terms represent a miniscule proportion of even the working adult Jewish population. Only among “local careerists” (wydwiżency) was there disproportionate Jewish presence, with Jews comprising just over 19 percent of 5404 people. Brakel (2007) reports similar findings for the Barnowicze region. Moreover, to the extent there was a Jewish presence, it was more pronounced at the lower rather than the upper levels of Soviet administration. For example, in the March 1940 elections to the Supreme Soviet, not a single Jew was among the representatives of the newly incorporated provinces of eastern Poland. The Galician city of Lwów was roughly 30 percent Jewish, yet Jews comprised a far lower percentage of its Soviet. Some other towns with Jewish majorities nonetheless had non-Jewish mayors (Pinchuk 1990: 49; Yones 2004, 48).

In short, although the face of the Soviet regime may have had more Jews than non-Jews were accustomed to seeing, on the whole it would appear Jews were under-represented in the administration both in absolute and relative terms. Those in more influential positions, who bore greater responsibility for Soviet crimes, were overwhelmingly non-Jewish. We can conclude two things from these observations. First, if pogroms were really about collaboration, then there ought to have been retaliation against non-Jewish collaborators. Yet there are exceedingly few such instances. Żbikowski (2007: 348) writes of the “discount” generally applied to Polish and Belarusian collaborators. According to one eyewitness, in July 1941 soldiers returning to Bolechów (in Galicia) wearing Soviet uniforms after the depar-
ture of the Red Army were killed only if they were Jews (Mendelsohn 2006, 195). Similarly, regarding the city of Lwów, Syzper observes that, “[S]omewhat tacitly all Ukrainians agreed to peace. Nobody [no Ukrainians] was attacked for participating in the Soviet administration” (AZIH 301-4654). If there were pogroms against non-Jews in retaliation for collaboration, no one ever reported them. Clearly anti-Jewish sentiments outweighed the anti-Soviet ones when it came to retaliation. Second, given the tenuous relationship between non-Jewish perceptions of Jewish collaboration and actual Jewish collaboration, it is difficult not to conclude, along with Mick (2007) and Brakel (2007), that these perceptions have more to do with anti-Semitic stereotypes that pre-date the Soviet occupation than with the occupation itself. This brings us to another important proposed explanation for the pogroms, anti-Semitism.

**Anti-Semitism**

Among those who see the 1941 pogroms as simply yet another manifestation of a long history of anti-Jewish discrimination and violence, anti-Semitism is an obvious explanation. How else to explain the brutality, the humiliation, the desecration of religious objects, and the victimization of old women and children? After all, these were hardly the first pogroms to have struck Poland, even in the twentieth century. There were a few scattered pogroms during the period when the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland in September, 1939 (Himka 1997, 182), and a major wave of anti-Jewish violence between 1935 and 1937. For example, in 1936 there were 21 pogroms and 348 “outbreaks” in the Białystok region (Tolisch 1937). In

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9 You know, if you had something with the Jews, you killed them. I’ll give you an example. After the Soviets retreated, that summer of ’forty-one, a lot of Jewish boys who’d been conscripted by the Russian had made their way home to Bolechow—they’d been drafted into the Russian army and were returning home. So the Ukrainians were standing on the bridge looking into the returning soldiers’ eyes as they came back, and if they thought someone was a Jew, they threw him down from the bridge into the river. And it was a river with big boulders and so forth, you can imagine what happened.
August, 1937 alone Jews in 80 different localities suffered attacks (Melzer 1997, 66). Less widespread violence occurred in the early 1930’s in universities, where some students hoped to pressure the government to limit the number of Jewish pupils (Michlic-Coren 2000, 35). Hundreds of pogroms occurred between 1918 and 1920 in Polish and Ukrainian-inhabited areas in the southeast, where Jews were caught in the middle of a Polish-Ukrainian struggle for political supremacy. During the November, 1918 Lwów pogrom Polish perpetrators destroyed Torah scrolls and humiliated religious Jews, foreshadowing the widespread ritualized violence of 1941 (Hagen 2005, 137-138). Other pogroms, resulting in hundreds of deaths, occurred in the Russian part of Poland between 1903 and 1906 (Lambroza 1992).

Nor were pogroms the only means by which Jews were attacked. Although Jews participated in most aspects of interwar Poland’s economic, social, and political life, they also suffered discrimination, both formal and informal. As detailed by Rudnicki (2005), the last legal restrictions against Jews left over from the partition era (before World War I) were lifted only in 1931, a decade after the establishment of independent Poland. But Jews still had to contend with the efforts of right-wing Polish nationalists to curb Jewish rights and circumscribe Jewish influence. In the 1930’s, for example, nationalists organized boycotts of Jewish businesses and portrayed the Jews as an “alien element” that was incompatible with Polish national life (Rudnicki 2005, 160). They made numerous political proposals, such as to deny Jews equal political rights, to prevent them from entering military service, and to bar them from employment across a range of professions. Though these never made it very far politically, both Jews and non-Jews who wanted to protect equal rights were forced into a position of having to argue against them.

Other measures, less overtly discriminatory against Jews but with barely disguised (and sometimes undisguised) anti-Jewish intent, were popular enough to become law. These included a ban on “inhumane” (read: kosher) animal slaughter,
a more restrictive citizenship law, and various measures empowering state officials to regulate their spheres of activity in ways that ultimately resulted in a reduced Jewish presence (Melzer 1997, 81-94). Among the better-known of these measures pertained to higher education. Under pressure from nationalist students and their allies, in 1937 the education ministry issued regulations that segregated seating areas for Christians and Jews across higher education, with punishment for those who failed to comply. The so-called “ghetto benches” resulted in a drastic decline in Jewish enrollment (Rudnicki 2005, 166; Melzer 1997, 71).

To these we can add what authors have referred to as non-Jewish “folk culture” or “folk prejudice.” Generalizations are hazardous given the dearth of systematic evidence, but there is some consensus that ordinary non-Jews viewed Jews as something of an alien element in their midst, not necessarily mortal enemies but certainly not as as one of their own. Originally Jewish difference was construed primarily in religious terms, with Jews cast as Christ-killers and enemies of the Church. For Gross (2001: 122-124) this image of the Jews lay behind the 1941 pogroms in Radzilow and Jedwabne, where “peasant mobs”, imbued with deeply-ingrained beliefs about the Jewish need for the blood of Christian children to prepare the Passover matzo, swooped in for primitive slaughter and plunder. Over time other stereotypes were added to the religious one: Jews as swindlers, as atheists, as arch-capitalists, as communists. In the case of Ukrainians, Himka (1997, 182) argues that within the Galician peasantry there existed a belief that “a day of reckoning was coming when all the Jews would be slaughtered.” Whatever the particular stereotype, Jewish “otherness” meant that, however cordial the relationship might be between Jews and non-Jews at times, in the end non-Jews would not feel the same solidarity with Jews that they felt towards one another (Struve 2012, 271-272; Weeks 2005, 29-30).

Neither successive Polish governments nor the Roman Catholic Church con-
doned physical violence against Jews, and indeed at the highest levels both explicitly condemned such violence. At the same time, however, many influential political and religious leaders sympathized with the idea of defending Polish interests against a perceived Jewish threat. A full accounting of either the evolving state attitude toward or Roman Catholic views of the Jews is beyond the scope of this study. Here we provide only some illustrative examples. In June 1936 Premier Sławoj-Składkowski all but expressed support for the nationalist boycotts, stating that “[If you want] an economic struggle, then by all means go ahead.”\textsuperscript{10} By 1938, acting as Minister of Internal Affairs, he was less equivocal, claiming that the struggle against the Jews was “a struggle of economic necessity.”\textsuperscript{11} In 1936 both Roman Catholic Primate August Hlond and Archbishop of Cracow Adam Sapieha issued pastoral letters that condemned violence but also endorsed the boycotts and accused Jews of a host of other threats to Poland, such as atheism, bolshevism, and corruption (Michlic 2006, 122-123). The portrayal of the Jews as what Michlic (2006) refers to as a “threatening other” was also visible in the Catholic press (Landau-Czajka 1994, 146-175) and in the attitudes of portions of the lower Catholic clergy (Libionka 2005, 234-237).

There is no question that antagonism toward Jews has had a long history in Polish lands, that during the interwar period the atmosphere became increasingly hostile, and indeed violent, toward Jews, and that in summer, 1941 many pogrom perpetrators were animated by hatred or rage (or both). But we should nonetheless not be too quick to infer that the wave of pogroms in summer 1941 can be reduced to anti-Semitism. First, the number of pogroms that occurred is not consistent with a one-sided portrayal of interwar Poland as uniformly hazardous for Jews. As noted above, pogroms occurred in roughly 9 percent of localities where Jews and

\textsuperscript{10}Cited in Melzer 1997, 21.
\textsuperscript{11}Cited in Rudnicki 2005, 160.
non-Jews dwelled together. Even one pogrom is one too many, but over 90 percent of the places where a pogrom could have occurred experienced no pogrom at all. Despite the increased opportunity offered by the German invasion and the collapse of state authority, the vast majority of Poles and Ukrainians did not perpetrate pogroms, and the vast majority of Jews were not victims of them. If interwar Poland were as riven with anti-Semitism as the “pessimistic” view would have it, and anti-Semitism were indeed the primary motive behind pogroms, then we would expect far more pogroms than we actually observe. The relative rarity of pogroms thus implies one of two things: either persecution of Jews was not as widespread or deeply held as in the “pessimistic” view, in which case its more limited distribution might (or might not) account for the pogroms that we observe; or such persecution was widespread and therefore could not have accounted for the pogroms.

We dissent from the “pessimistic” view, which tells only part of the story, though no doubt the dominant one. Although Jews in interwar Poland certainly experienced discrimination and violence, their story is not one of unremitting doom, even in the 1930’s. For example, Jewish commerce survived, and in the case of large enterprises in some ways even thrived, despite nationalist boycotts and acts of violence (Marcus 1983, 243-245). Although small traders suffered far more, even at the end of 1938 half of such traders were still Jews. Moreover, for all of interwar Poland’s faults, Jews enjoyed many freedoms permitted under the Polish system (Mendelsohn 1986, 138). They formed their own political parties that competed and won seats in elections, and served as representatives of other parties. They had a lively cultural and civic life, including a Hebrew and Yiddish press, a system of schools, and sundry religious and other volunteer organizations. Jews were free

We borrow the label “pessimistic” from Polonsky (1994), which provides a balanced overview of the debate on how much anti-Semitism there was in interwar Poland. See also Mendelsohn (1994).
to be Hasidic or zionist or socialist or marxist or even Polish. Mendelsohn (1986, 139) lauds “the extraordinary creativity of Polish Jewry.”

Although more radical Polish nationalist views of Jews spread among the elite as the 1930’s wore on, not all non-Jewish leaders were hostile, and some, albeit a distinct minority, actively promoted joint cooperation between Jews and non-Jews. For example, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and (Jewish) Bund organized various joint actions in protest against anti-Jewish initiatives. The PPS stood alone in the late 1930’s as the only major (non-Jewish) political party that did not openly advocate a Poland free of Jews, and some of the leadership explicitly condemned the rising anti-Jewish tide (Brumberg 1989, 82-89; see also Holzer 1994, 202; Melzer 1997, 24-25). There were similar liberal currents within the Catholic Church, though before the war they never influenced Church policy (Polonsky 1997, 209; Connelly 2002, 653). Michlic (2006, 77-78) lists a number of other prominent non-Jewish political and intellectual elites who denounced the violence and the idea that Jews were the enemy of Poles.

Notwithstanding a prevailing folk prejudice with its stereotypical image of Jews, there is little actual evidence that the nationalists’ more sinister views were even close to universal at the mass level. Consider the boycott of Jewish businesses, a key nationalist demand that by the late 1930’s was being encouraged even in pastoral letters of the Catholic Church. According to Marcus (1983, 244-245), the vast majority of peasants nonetheless patronized Jewish traders because the prices were lower. That decision hardly implies a love for the Jews, but it is consistent with Weeks (2005, 29), who notes that the most important anti-Semites were middle-class, and even in the interwar period were never too successful at selling their program among the peasantry. The overview of memoirs in Bronsztejn (1994) illustrates that there were many non-Jews that had sympathy for Jews or judged them as individuals by the same standards they judged other non-Jews. Jolluck
(2005) analyzes the testimonies of thousands of Polish women who during the Soviet occupation were considered “harmful” by the authorities and thus deported to the Soviet Union. Even among this sample, which was almost certainly more nationalist in orientation than Poles as a whole, roughly one-third expressed either positive or neutral views of Jews. That counts as a lot against a baseline assumption of ubiquitous hatred of Jews.

The second reason for caution in prematurely reducing the 1941 pogroms to anti-Semitism concerns what gets counted as anti-Semitism. At risk of oversimplification we can identify both “broad” and “narrow” understandings. In the “broad” understanding anti-Semitism is something of a grab-bag of different kinds of hostility (e.g., Brustein 2003; Gross 2006; Michlic 2006). It includes cases in which the primary target happens to be Jews for incidental reasons, as for example the nationalist economic boycott. Given the Jews’ position in the Polish economy (to be discussed further below), the nationalists desire to claim a commanding position for Poles in commerce was bound to have the largest effect on Jews. It includes cases where the primary target could well have been other groups but the Jews were singled out, as in beliefs that Jews were uniquely enthusiastic in their support for the Soviet occupation. Poles might well have pinned the accusation on Belarusians but didn’t. It includes cases in which the target could only be Jews, as in accusations of deicide or the ritual murder of Christian children.

The “narrow” understanding of anti-Semitism, by contrast, excludes scenarios in which Jews are targeted in their role as prosperous traders, sympathizers with communism, or supporters of the Soviet occupation. In the “narrow” view anti-Semitism refers only to instances in which Jews are targeted for being Jews. For example, Blobaum (2005, 4) contrasts the anti-Semitic 1918 Lwów pogrom, where as noted above religious Jews were humiliated and religious objects desecrated, with the 1898 Galician pogroms (Stauter-Halsted 2005), where the victims were
Jews, but who were targeted “as owners of inns, taverns, and distilleries.” In the former case the pious could have avoided injury only by ceasing to be Jews; in the latter the victims’ Jewish identity was seen to be ancillary.

We take no position on whether anti-Semitism ought to have the “broad” or “narrow” interpretation except to say that for our purposes it is better to “split” rather than “lump.” We would like to know which purported motive for the 1941 pogroms best accords with the observed distribution of those pogroms. Were the pogroms revenge for alleged Jewish support of the Soviet occupation? Were they about robbery and the opportunity to get rid of economic rivals? Were they about ridding the nation of an alien and fundamentally unassimilable group? For analytic clarity we refer only to the last question as implying anti-Semitism. We operationalize local-level anti-Semitism using the interwar vote for nationalist parties that espoused the “narrow” view of anti-Semitism. These parties are described in more detail in Chapter 2. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that at best there is a middling relationship between the distribution of mass anti-Semitic attitudes and pogrom occurrence.

**Economic Competition**

Another family of explanations relates to economic rivalry and hardship. The study of the economic roots of ethnic violence has a long pedigree in comparative politics (Bonacich 1972; Horowitz 1985; Forbes 1997). Three kinds of arguments get made. One focuses on the deleterious effects of economic downturns, which lead to the scapegoating of vulnerable minorities. Jews would be particularly targeted in times of crisis because non-Jews associate them with markets and capitalism (Rogger 1992; Rohrbacher 1993). We don’t doubt the applicability of this hypothesis under more settled political conditions, but even the most creative conspiracy-mongers were not blaming the Jews for the Nazi invasion and concomi-
tant economic collapse. The economic scapegoating hypothesis lacks prima facie validity.

A second and related economic explanation focuses on competition in ethnically-segmented labor markets and economic production. In this view Jews constitute a quintessential “middleman minority” (Blalock 1967). As summarized by Olzak (1992: 40), such minorities are distinguished by dwelling in enclaves, their sojourner status, and “concentration in finance, commerce, and other jobs that mediate between producers and consumers …” Of these characteristics only sojourner status does not clearly characterize the Jews. At just under 10 percent of the population, according to figures from the late 1920s and early 1930s Jews comprised over 40 percent of university graduates (Marcus 1983: 67), over 70 percent of those employed in commerce, and controlled 39 of 137 joint-stock companies in commerce (Tomaszewski 1989: 147). Particularly sensitive were the small market towns, the *shtetlach*, where Jews were demographically weighty and tended to be notably wealthier and more influential than their peasant neighbors. Jews were not sojourners in Poland in the literal sense, having dwelled in Poland for hundreds of years. Nonetheless, as noted above, many non-Jews, particularly on the right of the political spectrum, considered them a foreign element. In the middleman minority view Jews are most vulnerable to pogroms where they are most segregated from non-Jewish populations and where they have excessive influence over important economic sectors, such as commerce. Adapting Olzak (1992: 40), in these areas Jewish success is likely to be seen as a threat both to non-Jewish elites who seek to maintain power and to those in lower-status positions who resent their economic reliance on Jews.

Ethnic economic competition ought to be a compelling explanation. Having regained their own state after well over century of being submerged in other empires, many Polish leaders were keen to take ownership of the new state. As we
have discussed, the idea of “Polonizing” the economy—ensuring that ethnic Poles dominated—originated with rightwing nationalist elites. But by the latter half of the 1930’s it had become more broadly accepted and led to calls for an economic boycott of Jewish businesses and scattered pogroms. Unfortunately we lack good local-level indicators of economic competition between ethnic groups. As an admittedly inadequate proxy we use a dummy variable identifying the shtetlach, the small market towns where we know that such competition was most bitter. A shtetl was basically a small town that had lots of Jews, so this indicator will unfortunately capture both demographic and economic dynamics. We find that in the Polish-dominated northeastern voivodships a shtetl was not more likely to experience a pogrom (conditional on levels of nationalism and other factors), while in the Ukrainian dominated southeastern voivodships the opposite was true.

A third and closely related economic explanation argues that the 1941 pogroms occurred where non-Jews sought to rob Jews of their wealth. Looting during the pogroms is well-documented (see, e.g., Żbikowski 2007, 343-345). In the case of the Jedwabne pogrom, for example, we know that peasants from surrounding villages brought carts to carry away Jewish property. In other cases Jews were able to buy their way out of trouble, at least temporarily. But we should not confuse looting that might occur incidental to a pogrom with looting as the motive for a pogrom. If robbery or extortion were the driving force, we would expect pogroms to occur where the difference in wealth between Jews and non-Jews is the largest. One way we proxy for this is with illiteracy, which was greater among non-Jews than Jews and correlated with standard of living. The problem with the illiteracy data, as with most such indicators of wealth disparity, is that they are not generally available at the local level. However, we are fortunate to have data from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee on the location of free loan associations. These associations were established to assist Jews in economic distress by offering
no-interest loans for economic development. According to the wealth hypothesis pogroms should take place in localities where Jews were too prosperous to warrant a free loan association. We are unable to include this variable in our analysis of ethnic Polish regions, but we find little evidence of a wealth effect in Ukrainian Galicia.

**Political Threat and Ethnic Violence**

Our explanation focuses on dueling nationalisms, and is broadly consistent with the “power-threat” model initially developed to understand the dynamics of U.S. race relations (Blalock 1967). Power-threat theory argues that where minority groups threaten the dominance of the majority, the majority will take actions to suppress minority power. In the postbellum U.S. South, for example, this view holds that whites saw two sources of threat to their continued racial dominance. One was the sheer number of liberated blacks, which led to white fear of being outnum-bered. Another was the influence of political parties such as the Republicans and later the Progressives, who were more sympathetic than the Democrats to black civil rights. The theory maintains that where the black threat was most acute—where blacks constituted a substantial minority and racially inclusive parties were popular—whites intent on preserving the racial status quo were most likely to implement measures of social control such as electoral disenfranchisement, Jim Crow legislation, and lynching (Tolnay and Beck 1995: 57).

We argue that the difference between violent and non-violent localities in Poland lies in a similar combination of the popularity of parties supporting minority rights and polarization between Jews and non-Jews. There are three important explanatory factors, each of which can be measured at the local level and can independently influence the probability of a pogrom: the popularity of Polish and Ukrainian
parties advocating ethnic tolerance, the demographic weight of Jews, and the degree to which Jews advocated national equality with Poles and Ukrainians. Let us first address the effect of ethnically tolerant parties. One of the most important divisions within mass opinion in interwar Poland pitted nationalists who advocated imposing a homogeneous culture throughout the territory against others who preferred more inclusive nationality policies. Although this conflict is sometimes reduced to one between majority and minority groups, in actuality both majorities and to a lesser extent minorities were internally divided on these issues.

For Poles this conflict played itself out in the political struggle between two blocs of parties: the National Democrats and their allies, who sought a “Polish” Poland with minimal minority rights, and the party of the dictator Marshal Piłsudski, the BBWR, which favored an accommodation with the minorities in exchange for allegiance to a multinational state led by Poles. Ukrainians were a minority in Poland but constituted a majority in the southeastern region of Galicia. They were basically united in their desire for autonomy (from Poles) but like Poles were divided on the extent to which Jews could be included in their national project. According to power-threat theory pogroms would be more likely to occur where the popularity of tolerant parties indicated a population supportive of pluralistic nationality policies. In these areas the nationalists would have felt the most threatened and attacked Jews in the hopes of forestalling the need to acknowledge Jewish national rights. Of course this is only true up to a point: there would be no perpetrators in localities where all the non-Jews respected Jewish rights. Sadly such a situation appears to be exceedingly rare. We show that in accordance with power-threat theory the probability of a pogrom increases with support for the ethnically pluralist BBWR party.

The second factor correlated with the likelihood of a pogrom is the size of the Jewish population relative to that of non-Jews. Where Jews were few in number
they posed little danger to Polish and Ukrainian authority, and there were correspondingly few pogroms in those localities. But the likelihood of a pogrom went up in tandem with the proportion of Jews. Part of this was probably about increased Jewish visibility, which made Jews easier targets. But a more important aspect was the potential threat substantial Jewish numbers posed to non-Jewish dominance. Polish and Ukrainian nationalism had never been sympathetic to Jewish difference, and attitudes hardened after the Nazi seizure of power and death of the dictator Marshal Piłsudski. This put the Jews in a difficult situation. Allaying with the Polish or Ukrainian nationalists might have allayed nationalist fear, but at the unacceptably high cost of forsaking Jewish culture. Any other option left the Jews open to suspicion of disloyalty to the national cause. For nationalists, then, Jews were inherently suspect. We illustrate the positive correlation between the Jewish population proportion and the occurrence of a pogrom using interwar census data on ethnic and religious affiliation.

The third factor associated with pogroms is the proportion of Jews that sought recognition as a nation equal to that of the Poles or Ukrainians. Among the political options that significant numbers of Jews actually pursued in interwar Poland, Jewish nationalism had arguably the least sympathy among non-Jews. (We do not count communism. Contrary to popular belief both then and now, Jewish support for communism was miniscule at the mass level. See Kopstein and Wittenberg 2003; 2011.) Jews who identified with non-ethnic parties that acknowledged at least some minority rights might well have been seen by Polish and Ukrainian nationalists as a threat, but at least they would have gotten some credit from those non-Jews who saw in that identification a reasonable attempt to fully participate in political life as Jews. But even non-nationalist Poles and Ukrainians balked at the idea of Jewish self-government, comprehensive Hebrew and Yiddish education, and other rights the Jewish nationalists were hoping to acquire. Localities where
Jews supported national equality with the majority group proved particularly vulnerable to pogroms. In these areas, where non-Jews felt the least solidarity with their Jewish neighbors, Jews were doubly cursed: they contained a greater number of both potential perpetrators and non-Jews who didn’t feel enough solidarity with the Jews to intervene on the Jews’ behalf. Our indicator of Jewish nationalism is the proportion of Jews who supported parties advocating national rights. We compute this quantity from interwar census data on the number of Jews and the electoral results obtained by the Bloc of National Minorities and the Galician Zionists, two of the leading parties promoting Jewish national rights. We show that the greater the proportion of Jews voting for these parties, the more likely a pogrom.

The role of the non-Jews who do not participate directly in the violence is crucial. First, they may of course warn Jews of the impending attack or rescue them if it is imminent. There are many documented cases of violence having been averted, frequently at great risk to the lives of the rescuers. Second, and more commonly, they contribute to what Horowitz (2001: 326-373) calls “the social environment for killing.” Would-be perpetrators may refrain from acting if they do not sense broader popular support for violent activity. Fujii (2009: 30) describes a range of responses to genocide between rescuing on the one hand and perpetrating on the other. It is the bystanders, who neither rescue nor kill, that often set the tone of community expectation for or against violence independent of any state instigation. The most important of these bystanders are authoritative figures such as priests or teachers, whose statements and actions will be interpreted to signal approval or disapproval. Pogroms occur when there are both perpetrators motivated to act and others who either implicitly or explicitly are willing to condone the violence.

It might appear puzzling that in the midst of the Nazi offensive against the Soviet Union ordinary non-Jews could even think that attacking Jews would improve
Why Pogroms in Some Localities and not Others?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economic competition</td>
<td>Shtetl/ free loan assoc.</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>Vote for anti-Semitic parties</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet occupation</td>
<td>Vote for communist parties</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>Jewish pop/vote for ethnic &amp; tolerant parties</td>
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Table 1: Why do pogroms occur in some localities and not others? Leading hypotheses, the indicators we use to test them, and the strength of the evidence in their favor.

their national prospects. But this is because we have the benefit of knowledge of the horrors that were to come. In summer, 1941 most civilians, Jewish or not, could not have known what ultimate fate awaited the Jews or even how bleak Polish or Ukrainian national prospects were. The Germans did murder thousands of Jewish and non-Jewish civilians during summer, 1941, and often in the most brutal manner, but the ghettos had yet to be fully operational, plans for total extermination of the Jews had yet to be implemented, and many non-Jews were still being lulled by the Germans into believing they would be treated leniently if they joined the fight against the Soviet Union. Consequently, non-Jewish civilian populations could have seen the lawless atmosphere as an ideal and perhaps their only opportunity to rid themselves of competitors in anticipation of a future autonomous national life. This was certainly the message the Germans wanted to telegraph as they strove to incite local populations to attack their Jewish neighbors.

We summarize the alternative and main hypotheses in Table 1. The hypotheses will be discussed more fully in chapter 3, and then tested in chapters 4 and 5. In the remainder of the present chapter we discuss our data and methods, and provide a roadmap of the book.
Research Design

All research on the spatial distribution of violence must grapple with an inevitable tension between the level of aggregation at which violence takes place and the ecological units for which there are data to test competing explanations. Brass (2003: 28) notes that in India and the United States ethnic riots never take place across entire cities, but instead occur in neighborhoods or even on specific streets. Much the same could of course be said for other countries. Yet at the same time systematic economic, political, and social data to test competing explanations for such violence are usually available only for municipalities or larger geographic units. Important micro-comparative data collection exceptions such as Kalyvas (2006) notwithstanding, researchers usually address this mismatch in one of two ways.

Some aggregate violent incidents up to the level at which existing demographic or other explanatory information may be matched, be it cities (Wilkinson 2004; Spillerman 1970; 1971), counties (Olzak 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995), or even regions (Petersen 2002). While such aggregation may be necessary to test competing explanations, it does entail a loss of information, in this case spatial variation in violence. The higher the level of aggregation, the poorer the fit is likely to be between the values of the explanatory variables at the higher level and the values the variables would have had had they been measurable at the micro-level locations where the incidents actually took place. Consider again the effort to explain the pattern of lynching in the postbellum U.S. South. It is of course an important finding that there is a negative correlation across counties between the popularity of parties supporting amicable relations between whites and blacks and the incidence of lynching (Tolnay and Beck 1995, 197). However, this fact by itself tells us little about whether localities within counties where those parties were popular were the
places that had the fewest lynchings. Inferring the local outcomes from the county results is tricky even with ideal data and exemplary methods (Achen and Shively 1995; King 1997). Even analyses of cities, which largely avoid aggregation issues, have to deal with the problem of urban bias.

Other researchers eschew large-N analysis in favor of case studies (e.g., Brass 2003; Gross 2001, 2006) or small-N comparisons (e.g., Varshney 2002). We do not gainsay that much can be learned from these exemplary studies and the research traditions they represent. Indeed, the harrowing account of the 1941 Jedwabne pogrom in Gross (2001), with its provocative claims regarding Polish anti-Semitism and collaboration with the Nazis in the extermination of the Jews, led to a passionate debate about the reason for the pogrom and a surge of research on other pogroms, of which the present study is a part. But the nuance that is gained through rich description of a small number of cases is inevitably paid for in conclusions whose external validity are questionable. Many aspects of Gross’s characterization of Jedwabne have been challenged. But even if his account were wholly accurate, we still would not know how representative Jedwabne is of localities where pogroms occurred. In fact, as we show in Chapter 4, Jedwabne is not at all like other pogrom localities in its neighborhood.

We employ a large-N, within-country quantitative approach, but which focuses on one wave of pogroms (in summer 1941), and includes a qualitative cross-regional comparison between one region where Poles were predominant and another where Ukrainians were the majority. This strategy offers a number of advantages. First, as noted at the outset of this chapter, the 1941 pogroms occurred under conditions of state and civil society collapse. This relieves us of the burden of measuring the role of the state in inciting pogroms and of civil society in modulating inter-ethnic conflict. Arguments focusing on the state and civil society are ex-ante precluded.

Second, our large-N data suffers much less than comparable data from the in-
formation losses due to aggregation. We match electoral and census data (to be discussed below) at the lowest geographic level at which they can be matched. For our six voivodships this yields nearly 2000 localities, ranging in size from villages to large cities. Our data do not span the entire population of the eastern borderlands. We were unable to find census data for the Nowogrodek and Wilno voivodships. This is unfortunate because in those areas we surmise that Lithuanians may have been much more prominent among pogrom perpetrators. We were also unable to analyze the very smallest villages. Here the limitation is not the census, which in 1921 covered even the tiniest rural outposts, but the electoral data. The state published results only for localities with at least 100 electors. Still, our data represent the best evidence we have to test our hypotheses. The inclusion of villages avoids both the ecological inference problems associated with larger units of analysis and the urban bias of town-only research.

Third, the comparison between the Polish-dominated northeast and the Ukrainian-dominated southeast allows us to explore, in a qualitative rather than quantitative manner, a set of potential explanatory factors that operate at a level of analysis above the municipality. As we elaborate further in later chapters, these factors include the historical legacies of having dwelled in different partitions prior to Polish independence (with the northeast in the Russian partition and the southeast in the Austrian partition), and differing Polish and Ukrainian notions of statehood and the role Jews might play in it.
Data

Pogroms

Those who study ethnic violence under settled political conditions usually have the benefit of being able to rely for information on the press or other organizations that, while certainly not wholly unbiased, at least do not have a direct stake in the conflict. Uncovering violent acts is difficult even under these circumstances due to selection effects: only larger episodes may get reported, and events outside of towns may be poorly covered or ignored entirely. The resulting urban bias almost certainly underestimates the true extent of violence, and blinds us from uncovering causes that might be particular to rural areas.

Obtaining accurate information on pogroms in summer, 1941 poses even more difficult challenges. There was a war going on, and not the kind of war where intrepid and neutral reporters could traipse around the battlefield recording atrocities. On the eastern front it was a clash of two of the bloodiest tyrannies in history and the scene of carnage that would later be called war crimes. What fragmentary evidence we have of what happened comes from a combination of German military and police reports, Soviet military correspondence, non-Jewish reminiscences, and above all the testimonies of perpetrators and survivors. Needless to say, the amount and quality of information is highly variable. There is an ongoing debate among Shoah scholars, for example, about the extent to which survivor accounts, which may be affected by faulty memory, antipathy toward members of other groups, and “contamination” by postwar discussions, should be accepted at face value in the absence of corroborating information. The same can be said for non-Jewish reminiscences, which suffer from similar problems and tend toward the self-exculpatory. This is not even to speak of Nazi and Soviet sources, which have every reason to distort the deliberate murder of civilian populations.
The often contested accounts of what happened in particular localities necessitates a minimalist approach to classifying pogroms. Adapting Horowitz’s (2001: 22) definition of a deadly ethnic riot, we define a pogrom (against Jews) as a collective attack on one or more Jewish civilians that is geographically limited in scope and in which the perpetrators are primarily civilians. Although for some places it is possible to reconstruct important information such as the number of victims or the demographic profiles of the killers, the available source material is too uneven to replicate that feat across all localities. This does limit the types of analyses we can perform. Spilerman (1976), for example, has sufficient information to statistically analyze the severity of U.S. race riots. Wilkinson (2004) is able to investigate riot proneness with data on the frequency with which violence occurred in particular localities. We are not so fortunate. Our main dependent variable is thus simply whether or not a pogrom occurred in a given locality.

Even reconstructing such minimal information about a locality required overcoming two big challenges. The first concerns identifying localities where pogroms did not occur. The evidentiary material tends to report instances of violence, but between the war, the Shoah, and the passage of time it can be unclear for some places whether the absence of documentation means there was no pogrom or just that neither perpetrators nor victims are alive to tell their stories. We compensate for this problem by capitalizing on a recent surge in scholarly interest in the culpability of local civilian populations in the Shoah. Spurred in part by the passionate reaction in Poland to accounts of what happened during the Jedwabne pogrom, historians have begun the painstaking work of locating and sifting through source materials to reconstruct what happened in even the smallest communities in summer, 1941 (e.g., Machciewicz and Persak 2002; Rubin 2006). Our pogrom database builds on this research.

The second challenge is that not every instance of anti-Jewish violence counts
for us as a pogrom. A key feature of pogroms is that the perpetrators be primarily civilians. Given that the pogroms were occurring in the middle of a war, it is thus important to establish for a particular place that the violence in question was not military. In some cases sources generally agree that the German military itself directly killed Jews, such as in the town of Białystok, where police battalion 309 burned alive between 800 and 1000 Jews in a synagogue (Szarota 2004: 215). For us such acts do not count as pogroms.

In the vast majority of cases, however, the evidence suggests that Germans were either not present, or were present but did not take a large role in the actual violence. Nationalists in Poland and Ukraine argue that even when the Germans refrained from direct participation, civilian populations were not responsible for pogroms because the Germans compelled them to commit the crimes. We do not doubt that there may have been instances of such coercion, but the available evidence does not support the broader inference. The general presence of German army units, police battalions, and mobile killing units in the region is of course indisputable. It is also clear that the Germans preferred their dirty work to be done by locals in so-called “self-cleansing” actions. For example, on June 29, 1941 SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich noted in a telegram that “Nothing is to be put in the way of the self-cleansing actions of anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles in the newly occupied areas. On the contrary, without trace they are to be unleashed and, when necessary, to be intensified and to be steered onto the right path …” The question is whether such incitement and orchestration count as compulsion. In general they do not. Few would deny that if the Nazis had truly wanted to compel the locals to act, they could have succeeded in doing so—the Nazis were not exactly timid about using force and intimidation to get their way. Yet there is strong evidence that the effort to incite pogroms had only uneven success (e.g., Brown 2004: 208) and no evidence that local populations were ever penalized for
having failed to act on German instigation. In short, while Germans wanted the locals to act against the Jews, they stopped well short of forcing the issue. The German presence does not automatically absolve civilian populations of responsibility. We will say more about the German presence in Chapters 4 and 5.

Election and Census Data

A different set of challenges relates to the municipality-level interwar Polish census and electoral data. The exigencies of war and realities of dictatorship mean that the available information is far less rich than in countries where elections and censuses occur with regularity. The outbreak of World War II precluded a census in 1940-41, and the war itself destroyed the municipality-level results from 1931. Our main source of demographic data is thus from 1921. Poland did have regular elections throughout the interwar period, but Piłsudski’s coup d’état meant that no election after 1928 was free and fair enough to be usable. Therefore our main source of popular political preferences are the 1922 and 1928 national parliamentary election results. The 1922 election is considered to be free and fair by the standards of the day. The 1928 election, conducted two years after a coup that brought Marshal Piłsudski to power, was marred by a modicum of administrative interference in the eastern provinces, the principal target being communist parties. Fortunately for us there is a record of these intrusions in the number of invalidated votes, which the state recorded. In some cases we rectify the undercounted communist vote by adding to it the invalidated vote. It would have been nice to have been able to download everything we needed from the ICPSR or other electronic archive, but we are apparently the first researchers to comprehensively exploit these data. They had to be entered from published materials.

The 1921 census is known to have overcounted Poles and undercounted minorities. To compensate we follow Tomaszewski (1985) and infer national affiliation
from the more accurate data on religious adherence. Roman Catholics are equated with Poles, religious Jews with Jewish nationality, the Orthodox with Belarusians, and Greek Catholics (Uniates) with Ukrainians. This solution does mis-categorize non-trivial numbers of Orthodox Ukrainians (in Wołyń) and Jews (by religion) in Galicia who categorized themselves as Poles by nationality. These issues are addressed in different ways. First, we assess the sensitivity of our results when areas likely to contain such populations are included and excluded from the analysis. Second, for Ukrainian areas we re-estimate some of our models using 1939 local-level demographic information found in Kubijovyč (1983). Finally, we check for robustness using powiat-level data from the 1921 and 1931 censuses.

A Roadmap

Chapter 2 begins the analysis with an historical overview of ethnic relations in the eastern Polish borderlands up until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941. The roots of anti-Jewish animosity predate the founding of independent Poland after World War I. We first show how 19th century debates on Jewish emancipation and the merits of ethnic versus civic forms of nationalism got recast during the interwar period into partisan struggles over state ownership, economic redistribution, and the proper limits of minority autonomy. We then discuss how these debates grew sharper and more ominous for Jews (and some non-Jews) with the rise of fascism in Germany and the 1935 death of the dictator Piłsudski, whose political party favored a reasonable accommodation with the minorities. Finally, we consider the Soviet occupation of 1939-1941, which spelled the end of Polish independence and further thwarted Ukrainian national aspirations. Because Polish and Ukrainian nationalist historiography argues that the 1941 pogroms were a response to Jewish collaboration with Soviet oppression, we discuss Jewish and
others’ attitudes toward Soviet rule. In Chapter 3 we introduce our data: where it comes from and what its limitations are. We then discuss measures for our explanatory variables and the statistical methods we employ to test our hypotheses.

Chapters 4 and 5 test our argument in two regions of Poland, the northeastern provinces of Białystok and Polesie (Chapter 4), where Poles predominated alongside substantial Jewish and Belarusian minorities, and the southeastern provinces of Wołyn, Lwów, Stanisławow, and Tarnopol, where Ukrainians predominated over significant Jewish and Polish minorities. In both regions we find that Jewish population proportion and interwar sympathy for parties advocating greater Jewish national autonomy are robustly related to an increase in the likelihood of a pogrom, but less support for similar claims about economic competition and anti-Semitism, and no support that communism led to pogroms. In the northeast, where the perpetrators of pogroms were primarily Poles, the relationship between communist popularity and pogrom likelihood is negative, a finding consistent with other evidence suggesting that non-Jewish communists were among the most resistant to anti-Semitic incitement. In the southeast pogroms were largely a Ukrainian affair, and we find no statistical relationship between communists support and pogrom outbreaks.

Chapter 6 extends the argument beyond Poland and Jews as victims. We first examine other areas that experienced pogroms in 1941, especially Lithuania and Romania, where in both cases the targets were Jews. Here we expect the same factors to be relevant as in Poland—Lithuanians and Romanians perceived Jews and the Jewish struggle for national recognition in broadly similar ways to Poles and Ukrainians. We then discuss earlier pogrom waves in Eastern Europe, especially that of 1917-1920 in Ukraine, which resembled the 1941 pogrom wave in the lack of central government control but differed in the prominent role paramilitary gangs played in the violence. We surmise that these gangs were less concerned
with the prospects of Jewish nationalism than in simply terrorizing anyone they suspected as not being fully supportive of Ukrainian independence. Finally, we examine violence beyond Europe, including the lynching of blacks in the U.S. and Hindu-Muslim riots in India. Tolnay and Beck (1995) and Wilkinson (2004) have already found evidence for the demographic component of the power-threat argument in the U.S. and India, respectively. We conjecture that although neither U.S. blacks nor Indian Muslims have sought national autonomy in the manner of East Europe Jews, the threat these minority groups are seen to pose is nonetheless conceived by the majority in similarly partisan terms.

In chapter 7 we conclude the book with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings. First, we revisit contemporary debates on the merits of minority assimilation for reducing inter-group violence. The traditional argument holds that assimilation ought to reduce such violence because the process of acculturation reduces the majority perception that the minority is a distinct group. According to this view Orthodox Jews, who were by far the most resistant to acculturation and the most visibly different from non-Jews, ought to have been the principal target of pogroms. But the pogroms were not about “otherness” in this specific cultural sense. In fact the Orthodox were among the least sympathetic to Jewish national aspirations, and at least in part supported “Polish” parties in hopes of securing their religious rights. Our findings suggest that cultural assimilation is no guarantee of safety, but also that something less demanding of minorities than cultural assimilation may be sufficient to secure that safety. Where minorities can find common ground with majorities in the political sphere, majorities may feel just enough solidarity with them to ensure peaceful inter-group relations.

Second, we weigh in on the still-sensitive issue of civilian culpability in the Shoah. Many Poles and Ukrainians are loath to accept responsibility for persecuting Jews because it challenges their self-image as victims and resisters of Nazism.
On the Polish side this was amply demonstrated by the hue and cry over what really happened during the Jedwabne attacks (Brumberg 2002). Contrary to the claims of the nationalists, however, local civilian populations were not victims of the war in the same way as Jews were. Ordinary Poles and Ukrainians may have died at the hands of both the Germans and Soviets, but they also willingly killed Jews, both in collaboration with and independently of the Germans. They were victimizers as well as victims. It is also true, however, that the vast majority of Poles and Ukrainians never participated in a pogrom. In our view the small number of pogroms relative to the number that could have taken place requires replacing the notion of *national* responsibility with a proper recognition of the local circumstances under which ordinary people committed such ghastly crimes. Perhaps then the painful issue of guilt and culpability can be put in proper perspective.
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