COURSE DESCRIPTION: This seminar is the first of a two-part course to provide graduate students with the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical tools necessary to understand and execute comparative research. The focus of this semester is especially on key substantive themes and theoretical questions in comparative inquiry; the second semester develops greater focus on issues of research design and empirical methods.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: Students are expected to attend all seminar meetings, to do the assigned readings in their entirety, and to participate actively and thoughtfully in class discussion. The grade for this course will be based on frequency and quality of class participation (50 percent) and a take-home final exam (50 percent). Use of laptop computers, cell phones, or any other communications or Internet devices in seminar is prohibited.

COURSE READER: A reader for the course will be available at University Copy, 2425 Channing Way (549-2335). Some course readings may be made available on bCourses.

BOOKS FOR PURCHASE: The following books are required and should be purchased as soon as possible:

Part I: INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Week 1, Aug 29: Introduction

Week 2, Sept 5: No class! (Labor Day holiday)

Week 3, Sept 12: Research Questions in Comparative Politics

Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (University of Michigan, 2003), Chapters 1, 2 and 5.

Part II: IDENTITIES

Week 4, Sept 19: Religion


Week 5, Sept 26: Ethnicity and Nationality

Max Weber, “Status Groups and Classes”; “Ethnic Groups”; and “Political


Week 6, October 3: Class


Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard. Chapters 1 and 4 (2 and 3 recommended)


Part 3: INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Week 7, Oct 10: Origins, Operations, Effects


**Week 8, Oct 17: The State**


**Week 9, Oct 24: Parties and Electoral Systems**


**Part IV: OUTCOMES**

**Week 10, Oct 31: Democracy and Authoritarianism**


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**Week 11, Nov 7: Order and Conflict**


**Week 12, Nov 14: Poverty and Prosperity**


**Week 13, November 21: Corruption, Clientelism, and Service Delivery**


**Week 14, Nov 28: Historical Legacies**


**Week 15, Dec 5: Reading Week**
Reading questions

These questions are designed for your consideration as you read the assigned chapters and articles for each week and may help to guide our discussion in seminar. Some of these questions are drawn from the department’s Comparative Politics field exams in the recent past.

**Week 3, Sept 12: Research Questions in Comparative Politics**

What are the dimensions of a good research question in comparative politics? What questions are not asked but should be, and why?

What makes a question comparative, as opposed to something else? What does or should distinguish comparative politics from other subfields (American, IR, political theory)?

Comparative politics has sometimes been studied around geographic regions or “areas.” As a means of advancing knowledge about the political world, does this way of dividing the field make analytical sense? Why/why not?

**Week 4, Sept 19: Religion**

What distinguishes the “stuff” of religious identity from other potential identities, such as ethnicity or class?

What does it mean for “religion” to be a cause? How can we specify theoretically, and test empirically, what “component” of religion is operative in a given context?

Although religious fundamentalism is often seen as a phenomenon salient largely in developing countries, it also has played a pivotal role in domestic politics within many advanced democracies. Consider how religious fundamentalism has shaped national politics in industrial democracies.

**Week 5, Sept 26: Ethnicity and Nationality**

Are the politics of ethnicity and the politics of nationalism different sides of the same story? Discuss with references to theories and cases.

How successfully do Habyarimana et al., Posner, or Dunning answer the question posed by the title of Chandra’s article: “What is ethnic identity and does it matter?”

Why do some social cleavages become politicized while others do not? How do identities such as ethnicity and nationality differ from others that could be mobilized politically, such as gender?

In seeking to understand contemporary election outcomes, is it useful to refer to social
cleavages? Are certain cleavages more resilient than others? Or have voters become so dealigned that other, more immediate factors weigh more heavily? If the latter, which factors matter? Consider with reference to two or more countries.

**Week 6, October 3: Class**

What distinguishes social class from religion or ethnicity as an identity? Does this have implications for theories that assess the formation of class identities or the effects of social class formations on political outcomes?

Does social class remain a relevant explanatory variable in today’s world? Discuss whether or not class identities can be used to account for at least two different types of outcomes—e.g., regimes, reforms, institutions, etc.

It was long believed that political mobilization on the basis of economic interest would gradually displace atavistic identities like ethnicity, language, and religion. Yet in recent years, these traditional identities have not only failed to decline, but have grown in political salience. Using examples from two or more regions, explain the rise of parties based on ethnicity, language, and/or religion. Consider the role of structural factors (such as a "clash of civilizations" or globalization), the failings of the political establishment, and the actions and strategies of the identity-based parties themselves.

**Week 7, Oct 10: Origins, Operations, Effects**

Institutional analysis has been deployed in all manner of ways. To some, institutions are an outcome; to others, a cause. Various prefixes—including historical, sociological, and rational-choice—have been affixed to the label “institutionalism.” Is institutionalism in the eye of the beholder, or is there a coherent intellectual core?

Are credible property rights enforced by the rule of law essential to the construction of a functioning market economy? What role do they play? Are there substitutes or functional equivalents of property rights? Or are property rights simply not that important? Consider these questions in light of the experiences of Chinese, Latin American, and other cases.

“Formal modeling has been far less influential in the study of comparative politics than it has been in the study of American politics. An important reason for this is that most of the action in American politics occurs within institutions with clear rules, enabling a modeler to construct and analyze a suitable game relatively easily. By contrast, many of the most interesting questions in comparative politics arise in settings in which the institutions and ‘rules of the game’ are unclear or perhaps even objects of contention in their own right. As such, other methods of analysis have proven more fruitful.” Evaluate this statement.

**Week 8, Oct 17: The State**
The nation-state seems to be under siege. Subnational forces such as ethnic cleavages and religious divisions have challenged the nation-state from within. Discuss the viability of the nation-state given these internal pressures. What type(s) of subnational fragmentation are the most potent challengers to national authority? Have subnational forces risen to the level of a serious threat to the nation-state’s viability? Or do they merely represent a shift in the kinds of challenges that national leaders have customarily confronted?

Decentralization of the state has received much attention in recent analyses of both the developed and developing world. Critically assess conceptualizations and measures of decentralization. What are the interesting propositions found in the literature on decentralization, both as an independent variable and a dependent variable?

Governments seek to extend direct authority only over geographic areas where they can raise revenue – either through taxation or extraction. In the tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan since there is limited economic activity and few natural resources, the state rules indirectly—i.e. by letting local leaders exercise sovereignty on its behalf. Is this argument correct? Could it be generalized?

Can political order emerge in the absence of a well-functioning state, and what kind of order emergences in this absence? What features of states are most important for order?

“The study of the state’s role in economic development is deeply problematic (or even meaningless) since the theory changes with each success or failure and thus hinges on case selection. If your example is China or Korea the statists cries are triumphant whereas if you look at Africa, South Asia, and parts of Latin America the anti-statists have broad grins.” Comment.

**Week 9, Oct 24: Parties and Electoral Systems**

Suppose we find a stable association between support for a party and belonging to a particular social identity group. What puzzles might this association suggest, and what questions does it help to answer? Does a strong association substitute for other evidence on causality? What are the costs and benefits here of inferring fire from the presence of smoke? Answer with reference to this week’s readings.

The study of social movements and/or political parties has suffered because of the need for most social scientists, as Hirschman says to “discover and stress regularities, stable relationships, and uniform sequences.” Should we heed Hirschman’s advice and instead “underline the multiplicity and creative disorder of the human adventure, to bring out the uniqueness of certain occurrences, and to perceive an entirely new way of turning a conceptual corner.” The latter may yield better explanations and advance our field more than the constant search for regularity. Do you agree?

“From Barrington Moore to Przeworski, democracy is explained by structural factors
such as class and income whereas everyone knows that the study of democratization relies far more on actions by individuals or groups. This is also true for the study of party systems where explanations revolve around electoral laws and other structural variables whereas research on particular parties always stresses the role of party leaders.”

Comment.

“Political parties face dual pressures – the need to respond to a changing political marketplace (which is conditioned by new economic and social conditions) and the relatively fixed ideological leanings of their activists, supporters and leaders. Successful political parties find a way to deal with these pressures quickly. If parties either respond too quickly to the changing environment or do not display ideological persistence they will fade away in short order. This dynamic explains the rise and failure of many political parties.” Do you agree?

In contemporary democracies, state and society are linked through a multiplicity of entities, including political parties, interest groups, and social movements. Some scholars see parties as the supreme vehicles of interest intermediation. Others argue that interest associations have largely supplanted parties as the key tie between citizens and the state. Still other scholars emphasize what they see as the crucial and perhaps growing significance of less formally structured entities, particularly social movements. How may we distinguish between these diverse forms of interest intermediation and expression in terms of their organizational structures, their functions, and their styles of operation? Do you think that parties are waning relative to other forms of sociopolitical organization? If so, why? If not, why not?

What accounts for the breakdown of national party systems? What factors might be theoretically linked to party system change? Discuss whether such changes signal a democratic renewal or a breakdown in institutions. Make sure to refer in your answer to at least two countries from different regions.

Comparativists have long argued that political parties fulfill the crucial function of interest aggregation. Yet many new (and some not-so-new) democracies have yet to develop structured, consolidated party systems. Do these developments threaten democratic governability? Why or why not? Make sure to refer in your answer to at least two countries from different regions.

Many comparative political scientists have detected what they regard as a decline in political parties. In the 1970s and 1980s, some analysts held that parties’ functions had largely been taken over by interest associations, at least in the advanced industrialized democracies. In the 1990s, many scholars noted dealignment and popular disaffiliation with parties in Latin America, as well as a failure of parties to establish a controlling presence in new democracies in the postcommunist region and Africa. Yet some analysts hold that the funeral for parties is premature at best. They argue that parties continue to serve as the indispensable link between state and society. Discuss this debate and stake out a position of your own. Flesh out your argument by using the experiences of countries
from at least two world regions.

Alan Ware once wrote “one of the least examined subjects in the field of party politics is how a party’s internal structures affect how that party relates to other parties in the system: such as in how it competes against its opponents, or how it co-operates with them, or whether it seeks to merge with any of them”. Using the example of two parties – each from a different country – discuss whether party organization or structural features such as social divisions and/or electoral rules and state institutions account for how each party mobilizes support.

**Week 10, Oct 31: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Redistribution**

Scholars have long sought the roots of authoritarian rule in domestic conditions: ethnic heterogeneity, class inequality, social anomie, political polarization, etc. What have we learned from this research program? Are we likely to be able to identify prerequisites to authoritarianism? If not, what other strategies would you recommend for understanding why some countries become dictatorships and others do not?

What advantages does a “historical perspective” bring to the study of democratization? What challenges or new issues does it bring to the fore? What is “comparative historical” research, and what makes it distinctive from other kinds of observational social science? As always, answer with reference to this week’s readings.

Hyper-personalistic (or “sultanistic”) regimes often lack the institutional infrastructure and purposive goals found in other types of authoritarian regimes. According to the logic of modernization theory or theories that tout the weight of international factors for regime survival, sultanism should be very rare or extinct. Yet it appears to be flourishing in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia. One might even detect signs of a renaissance in parts of Latin America. How would you explain the persistence and even resurgence of this most “primitive” form of dictatorship?

How much of any country’s regime type is attributable to domestic forces and how much is due to external forces? Does the answer vary across place? Offer at least a partial resolution to this question by analyzing either three or more regimes of different types or three examples from one regime type.

What do business groups want from the government? And how do they get it? Critically evaluate different approaches to these questions in the literature, with particular attention to the problem of what would constitute evidence of business interests and business influence. That is, how do we know what business groups want? And how do we know whether they influence policy outcomes?

The relationship between democracy and economic development has been debated for many years without any conclusive or definitive answer. How have various authors characterized the relationship between regime type and economic success? Compare and
contrast a range of works, or provide your own assessment. Discuss with reference to several different countries or regions.

**Week 11, Nov 7: Order and Conflict**

Cross-national research consistently shows that ethnic fractionalization is not an important predictor of civil war, yet case studies are largely focused on the ethnic mobilization in those wars. How might we make sense of this apparent contradiction?

Is ethnic conflict an anomaly? Discuss.

**Week 12, Nov 14: Poverty and Prosperity**

“Recent work by development economists has emphasized discrete interventions to combat poverty. Yet many of the factors that may shape long-term development outcomes are very difficult to manipulate, certainly for policy makers.” Comment. What productive overlap do you see between a focus on micro interventions and a focus on macro structure? For randomized impact evaluations, are there any methodological or design implications of the awareness of important, non-manipulated macro factors?

The study of institutional political economy in the tradition of Douglass North has seemingly fallen out of vogue, as development economists have increasingly turned to randomized controlled trials to argue in favor of micro-level interventions to alleviate poverty. Can a focus on national structures still be useful in informing our understanding of development pathways? Can a macro-level approach yield insights not gained through a micro-level analysis? In this context, discuss two institutionalist theories that can be used to explain differences in development patterns across countries. Assess the theoretical contributions of these theories as well as their empirical validity. Discuss with relevance to two cases of your choice.

Does rapid economic liberalization hinder or aid democratization in developing countries? What are the causal mechanisms that link economic policy change to political regime change, and how do they work? Do you detect cross-regional variation in the way that economic policy affects political regime, or does a unified logic underpin the relationship across regions?

Economists, sociologists, and political scientists all stress that property rights are critical to economic development, yet they define property rights differently and they link them to development in distinctive ways. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to the study of property rights, discussing both broader theoretical works and research focusing more narrowly on a specific type of property rights or a particular geographical region.

A large political science literature attests to the idea that authoritarian regimes are typically inferior to democratic ones. For example, dictatorships are said to be poorer,
less free, suffer more corruption, and more arbitrary and cruel. Yet despite these apparent deficiencies some scholars continue to extol the virtues of dictatorial rule. Why is this so? Are they deluded, or are there advantages to dictatorship that have not been sufficiently appreciated? If so, what are they? What draws some intellectuals to authoritarianism?

There is more than one flavor of capitalism and more than one pathway to development. What drives variation in economic development and adaptation? Are the variations rooted in national structures? Or in international explanations? Discuss at least one domestic and one international explanation. (Clearly present and discuss theoretical contributions and consider their empirical validity in at least two cases.)

In the 1980s, considerable research was conducted on the "developmental state." There is much less attention to this concept today. Whatever happened to the developmental state? Is the notion still salient for the field or was it merely an epiphenomenal deviation at a particular point in research time?

Under Boris Yeltsin, Russia began to democratize, but experienced corruption, instability, and economic collapse. Then Russia turned to Vladimir Putin, who rolled back democratic freedoms, but the economy embarked on a phase of rapid growth. Meanwhile, China steered clear of democracy altogether, and has been the fastest-growing economy on the planet. Is it appropriate to conclude, then, that in moving away from communism, countries must choose between building democracy and building prosperity, at least initially? Why or why not?

**Week 13, November 21: Corruption, Clientelism, and Service Delivery**

Corruption and clientelism are often studied by students of the developing world. Do theories and insights extend to the developed world, and in what ways?

Corruption is a persistent problem in many countries. Discuss how it has been addressed in at least two different countries or regions. How successful have these efforts been? How did the broader political/institutional context affect what strategies were chosen and their effectiveness? Suggest some additional evidence that would help test your argument.

Dissatisfaction with representative democracy stems from sources such as the power of interest groups; the increasing sway of bureaucracies; the widespread use of patronage; and excessive power vested in the hands of legislators. Voters, as a result, have sought to rejuvenate direct democracy. Is direct democracy an appropriate response to the different failings of representative democracy?

**Week 14, Nov 28: Historical Legacies**

What is a historical legacy? Can a critical juncture be recognized only retrospectively? What distinguishes a critical juncture from other major political or economic transformations?